Video: Threat Briefing: Geopolitical and Cyber Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Middle East | Duration: 3624s | Summary: Threat Briefing: Geopolitical and Cyber Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Middle East | Chapters: Welcome and Introductions (12.32s), Geopolitical Escalations Overview (61.825s), Iran Influence Operations (459.305s), Cyber Warfare Analysis (670.495s), Backdoor Deployment Techniques (1124.37s), Detection and Mitigation (1361.125s), Multi-Nation Espionage Campaigns (2142.915s), DDoS Detection Methods (2487.275s), Defense & Preparation (2717.68s), Conclusion and Next Steps (3552.14s)
Transcript for "Threat Briefing: Geopolitical and Cyber Impact of the Iran Conflict on the Middle East":
Okay. Hello, everyone. Assalamu alaikum and, good afternoon. Good morning. It's really I'm really happy for your attendance today. Today, we'll be discussing the geopolitical and cyber events related, to the war and specifically be focusing on the MENA region. First, let me introduce myself. My name is Abdulrahman Nolfi. I've been with the recorded feature for around seven years. I'm managing the intelligence services team, the TAMs and the consultants in The Middle East. We have with us as well Steffi. Hi, everyone. My name is Duffy Mendoza. I am a technical account manager in Recorded Future, and I report directly to Abdul Rahman. I've been in the company for five years. I'll give it to you, Abdul. Perfect. So we're gonna start with the geopolitical first. And as especially people in the region, you know how intense it was. And, we saw a clear overlap between geopolitical escalations, physical, targets of critical infrastructure, influence operation from, from Iran and other nation states. And also saw, the huge amount of cyberattacks that we, we have faced in every day in our work, how how we need to cover this type of events to protect our organizations. We saw the cyber operation even increase despite, the the war from Iran. It all started in February 28 when, Khomeini and other 40 RGC leaders were killed. And after that, Iran escalated very quickly against specifically GC countries, and, they had the critical infrastructure and energy. Then then Iran start mining the Strait Of Hormuz and blockage of Strait Of Hormuz, which we saw how it impact, the financial economic, in the region and specifically for GCC countries. Then houses started from Yemen started to enter the war. Then, on April 7, the cease fire happened. And after that, there was negotiation Islamabad. It's around, like, a month and a half, but it was really intense, during this period. In terms of, some statistics for GDC countries, we saw more than 30, facilities been struck. Facility been threatened all over, the MENA region around 25 or more. Around 23 civilians were killed in GC countries and huge impact financially, specifically related to the oil, in the GC was, impacted by 55%. We'll recap, the events happened for, specifically for the MENA, countries, from February 28 to April 7. You can see the most targeted country at that time was, UAE, and around ten people were killed. The facilities were were hit around nine. Huge amount of prone mess missiles, launched missiles, ballistic missiles, and was very high interception rate from the UAE military. In in impacted infrastructure, we saw, impact on energy, AdNOC assets. We saw cloud and tech, the AWS from the beginning of the war, which impacted, related to and this impacted some of the application and some of the, like, ADCB for example. We saw some interception happen and, impacted the building of Oracle. Transport and trade, we saw Dubai Airport were more hit a couple of times. Industrial like, Khalil Economic Zone, maritime, we saw also oil tanker, near to Jabali, struck as well. The certain, the remaining certain, currently or, like, before the peace, or the negotiation is, the, energy and distillation and bridges, especially bridges in Abu Dhabi. And American, tech companies, like the one in Media City, like Amazon, Google, they have a list of of, of offices that they're, might target. Also, they, mentioned also the AI hub the a AI hub in, Stargate in Abu Dhabi, one of the biggest in the region. Also, one of, one of them that been, mentioned as well. In Saudi Arabia, around three people were killed. Facilities more than six facilities. We saw also, injuries in, for US military, at Prince Sultan Air Base. Also huge huge amount of interception from, from Saudi military. Crude oil was, impacted even there's the the the other route, through, Yambo, which, the East West pipe. But still, the production, is around 7,000,000, barrel per day compared before the war was 15, barrel per day. Again, the diplomatic sites, military, they hit, like, US embassy. This threatened, the bridge between, Saudi and Bahrain. In Qatar, there was zeroes. Again, interceptions, huge amount of interception. The state of harm has impacted Qatar as well, during this, conflict. In terms of infrastructures, The US radar at all of that was struck multiple time. LNG, energy was also impacted and, production was reduced by around 17%. Just here, like, the other countries and you see here, I'm trying to just summarize the scene here. So the the target is clear. It's energy airports, ports, data centers, and military bases and specific military bases related to US. And, from IT perspective, that center is really important, for our operation. And, we need like, if there's no current business continuity plan, we need to set a business continuity. If this data center, for example, been hit, how our, our business were run. So that's something we need to consider, and we need to to have, a redundant redundancy plan. In terms of the the biggest country NGC was hit, like, in terms of oil was, was. Around 70% was, impacted in terms of oil production. Oman acting as a mediator. They they're not impacted still they acted as a mediator, but still some of the energy and maritime were hit. The export was not impacted badly as other GC countries because they have other ports beside the one that is closed for, that is linked to the street. Jordan and Turkey, interceptions and, and this is a main theme that the interception one of the threat to the NATO interceptions. Turkey acting as a mediator in the region. And, again, Jordan was also threatened for the bridges, in Jordan and, the energy sites. Okay. Now we'll talk about impulse operation. Back to you, Stephanie. Thank you, Abdul. Iran is fully implementing its influence capability with a history of layering influence operations with kinetic and cyber activities since at least 2023. There are three phases of Iran's influence, operations. First one, as you can see here, is strategic narrative shaping, which we've seen, in media outlets shaping narratives down to tactical battlefield. A key example is about the viral claims about ballistic missiles hitting USS Abraham Lincoln. Phase two here is the surge of covert networks. So we've seen this one as well, and we can expect inauthentic behavior on social media, sock puppet accounts, impersonating, activists, journalists. And last one here is, phase three, which is the psychological deterrence, which can take weeks to months. This will be a hybrid campaign targeting both international audiences to control deterrence, and Iran's domestic population to reinforce the narrative on the regime's survivability. On the screen right here, you can see this, is taken from the recorded feature platform. This is a really good validation for phase two. And as you can see here on February 28, there is a significant increase of the AI generated images involving GCC. So thousands of reference, as you can see, on February 28 are coming from social media. Such example is is next. Coinciding as well on February 28, there is a notable shift, that has been observed in the content language and narratives of post advertising VIP employment bots. So this is in regard to Ion 82. There are more frequent posts authored in English and Arabic, as you can see on the right side. Targeting global audiences are are more likely to leverage political and ideological motivations in solicitations for intelligence assets than financial motivations. As you can see here, these are the countries, that are, have been contacted, and, there's a huge here as well for the GCC countries. The recent diversification of the operations geographic scope highlights Iranian's intelligence services very likely intensifying efforts to to solicit physical attacks around the world as an asymmetric response to US, to the joint US Israel strikes. Another example here for intelligence operations is with Russia, Io storm sixteen seventy nine and Iranian Io storm twenty thirty five. There are media impersonations by Russian influence operation storm sixteen seventy nine, which continues to exploit the conflict in Iran, including advancing noncredible claims and media impersonations of Al Jazeera and also with Euronews. We can also see here for, Iranian twenty thirty five, also tracked, in recorded feature by InSig, ion twenty four. Accounts posted videos of strikes on US bases in Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, including footage of intercepted drones and missiles in Dubai and Bahrain. The account's also very likely to intend to amplify unrest following Iran's strikes on civilian targets in the region. Great. Now we'll move to cyber. So we'll be covering the cyber impact, during during the war. And again, specifically, we'll be focusing on the MENA region. So we saw a huge amount of, attacks, especially from our nation state and this makes sense. Even, even the war might slow things down or might, like, we have some reports talking about, their OPSIC. Operation security was not, it was failure in their, implementing that. But you can see here in the graph, in in 2025, there was around 54, events or we can say campaigns, we monitored, for the Iranian nation state. Only in q one and specifically during the war, this this was 35%, which is mean 65% of increase. And if we do projection of the war continue till end of the year, we're talking about one forty, different events and campaigns, which is your number can be one of the, the the best to be, like, a a year record for the campaigns from Iran. We're talking about their, their affiliates as well and their their RGC and MOS, groups as well. So So currently, we're mounting around 23 groups. 13 for them 13 of them are related to IRGC. Four, and six story to, attribute to MOS. Proxies, similar to the one related to Hezbollah and Yemen. And their primary target is infrastructure, government, energy, defense, telecom, all these industries, vast, amount of industries. Early in the war, we saw a lot of Iran, nexus doing the password spraying against hundreds of, GCC, public facing, applications and Microsoft three six five, which can indicate how the is the, the cyber warfare is connected, to, the political situation. We saw also how the military and the surveillance is also very connected, especially when we saw exploiting of IP cameras. The campaign was, basically to give access to the IP cameras in GCC, to the, Iranian military. Recently, seized also released a report related to exploitation of POC, and this can be very important for industrial and petroleum companies. And most likely is, linked to, cyber event Avengers. If we talk about the amount of service, which was massive as well, talking about more than 100% of, claims or, posts about, from different activist groups. From the one we confirmed, and I'm talking about when we say confirmed, I mean, that we saw a real traffic increase, using our tour or recorded future. We've seen more than 50% of a real traffic increase to, organization in the region, which is huge as well. Financial motivated actors, this is their time to gain profit from events like that. Similar to COVID, if you remember, there was big increase in in financial motivated actors, huge amount of fishing, lords make it easier, especially the lures that is using, war related. It's more than 130% increase increase. The cyber criminals, we saw also a big amount of attack with forum, post leaks to, GCC countries and MENA countries in in, during the war. Credential leaks as well increased, and this this ecosystem can help the other hacktivist and other, nation states can use this data against the organizations in, Middle East. Today, we'll be discussing, nation state Iran nation states. We'll be focusing a little bit on their tools, TTPs, and and detection mitigation. They're gonna move on the hacktivist side, and we're gonna finish by talking about the financial motivated. First, we're gonna talk about Muddy Waters. He's he's, the MIS, Ministry of Intelligence of, of Iran. They are, the high the highest number of campaigns came from them, especially against, GC. They are, using, this one of the reports that insect our our research team have released. We have multiple reports been, released, recently. So you can see here from our platform, the intelligence card. You can see the name of the threat actor, the, the target industries, like finance and, government and others. And you can see the different areas that, we are that, related to muddy water or Green Gulf. In the campaigns we we monitored, the MENA region was impacted, Middle East, North Africa, the sectors, energy, government and critical infrastructure. And of course, the objective is, Spanish campaigns. We'll talk about the first, the first campaign that we saw during, before a little bit before the war and during the war as well. And this campaign, had three patterns. The first pattern, is named char malware and, has a different name like, lamp, lampurat. So, basically, it's, it's a malware that's built in Rust so it can run on different platforms. Their c two is based upstream and downstream of the c two is based on Telegram bots. And, of course, the mother water is known for the PowerShell and command, CMD, hands on keyboard for that and, this one of their techniques. Then we saw that the, do side loading for one of the legitimate application with Amalish's, DLL, FM APP, which, this DLL basically will do a reverse tunneling using subscribe and and other instant, Kalim c two, which basically tunnel all the traffic for threat actors to, outside the organization or the victim. What they steal or what the target was, credential data and data from the victims. We saw also, AI development multiple times and this, resource, for example, in the code, some emojis and some indication that they're using AI in their development. Moving to, the pattern two, which is GhostFetch. So there's a first loader, and this one will drop another malware, the second stage malware named GhostBackdoor. The malware one is run first, it will be checking some, if it's running in a sandbox. So it's trying to do sandbox evasion. We'll talk about looking at, the hardware specs. If it's slow, that's highly, suggest it's running in a PM. User activity, mouse clicking, all of that, if it's running in a debugger. Then, also, we saw the the sample have overlap with, similar to other malwares from Muddy Water, so it's just suggest that it's linked to them. The persistently used, a registry key for and start up registry key to maintain resistance. Their c two, upstream, downstream, and the c two used to download the next, stage is, is, encrypted by AS and is hardcoded in the malware file. So once GhostFitch finish all this scanning, they go to and implement the next one, which is, GhostBackdoor. So this one is, basically gives them full interaction shell. It's like this type of malware that is can be, in their network of the victim for a long time doing espionage without getting detected. It will read, file ex exfiltration of files. Also, they're using, fragmenting commands. They fragment the commands to to ensure that they can evade, the detections. They're moving to the, final, pattern, which is HTTP VIP. So it's based on HTTP, and, also, it's running on a Python back end. This one, first, it will do some reconnaissance about the the victim to make sure that they're targeting the right one, make sure they are not running in a honeypot so they have a checks inside the malware, authenticate with the c two, this example of the domains that they used, and then they, deploy as well in a disk r m m two, which is very known for, muddy water techniques. As a user, any disk normally, it's easier. It's, like, easier than running commands on and, it's also gonna be a backup way of, c two c two downstream, of commands to the victim. We saw also some, typos or, like, for example, Tmax on Linux. They also wrote it in Farsi. So this suggests the keyboard also have Farsi, language. Next look at, we look at the same, malware we talked about, but in four waves. The first one was, in 2025, and this one was the able to compromise the mailbox of Amen Ministry. And you can see here in the screenshot on the right. And from there, they they use the trust relation, to other ministries in DC and MENA, and they start sending phishing emails that, impacted, a lot of organizations. And as they use, custom backdoor, highly suggested was HTTP VIP, no one mentioned, and using RM tools as well. Another another lure or another wave was financial deception and this one against UAE. And it was one of the targets that is, suggested is clear to finance and supply chain. The lure itself having financial record and the currencies in AD. The third one in 2026, was to air Arabia. So the the law that you see on the right here is having the logo of air Arabia. And the data inside the file, like, in terms of the name, the numbers, and all of this data used in the lure, it looks like they gain it from another leak, which make it make it look like more real. So it's not just fake number names and fake numbers and stuff like that. The it's the the data they use is, look legitimate to make the lure stronger for the victims. And in this one, the use gap, goes back door that we discussed. Final one was a rate to, consume a consuming report, for energy company. And this one, they use HTTP, VIP malware. This example of the one of the tools that they do a large scale social engineering campaign. So this is the tool the custom tool. They do orchestration of sending phishing emails to a lot of victims. Okay. Now we move, again, muddy water, but a different campaign. As I mentioned, there are many activities, from this group. So there's two things here very important that, they likely likely they use that malware as a service from Russia, and they use block blockchain as a c two to review the c two. So, the first is also so this is using phishing emails, then the PowerShell will load, or drop, a payload of two files. One is the malware, the sundry botnet, and the other one is persistent module. Persistent module to make sure that the malware is running in the machine, It's JavaScript based and, it it change their, registry key for persistence. Then they're using the ether hiding of the blockchain over Ethereum, for Ethereum. So this one, basically, the malware will connect to an RPC provider, and this RPC provider will provide, smart contract, ID. And this is a smart contract you can see on the right here. Basically, it's a part of the Ethereum that you can add any data. So they use this, functionality to add the c two of the, of the botnet. Really really, new technique, and it's really hard to detect as well. They check your location and the the malware will not run, for example, if it's it's, the victim is in Russia. And this also had like and it suggests it's, part of, Russia, malware as a service or, malware development. Then it will, after that, once it now it has the c two of the botnet, now it will use a WebSocket and encryption AS 25 to, start collecting information from the machine from the victim machine and then, using, tunnel and the the message coming encrypted and then obfuscated using JavaScript to obfuscate it and and run as activity. So, yeah, here is like it's really hard. It's really hard. It makes c two, tick down impossible because the domain cannot sync all it or or seize it. So it's really make it really challenging. So that's one of the techniques that we need to add to our list of, to, to detect and protect against muddy water. Great. Next one is a report that released recently from InSECT. Our research team, talked about the optic failure. So detected, multiple of surface that's related to muddy water, and and this might be, they didn't put, like, they didn't implement good operation security. And this may be due due to the war, the disruption of the war. Maybe that's one of the reason. But we gain a lot of great stuff from this. We learn a lot of great stuff from from this directory is the one here. The screenshot we have here. For example, we got a big list of targets, tools, exfiltration data, c two connections. We we we, we collect a lot of information about their, victims and the tools. You can see here on the right, UAA, for example, in MDC group, which is a maritime organization. We saw the scans for Citrix bleed. We saw also the already prepared Assim Lord document with no matter where we discussed HTTP VIP. Egypt air documents leaks. A lot of other Egyptian doc files were leaked in in these directories. Jordan government, with mail, login. A lot of scams was, targeting Saudi Arabia as well. Other countries as well. I'm I'll be I'll not be covering it now. The vulnerabilities, which is something very important we need to look at, and this is the vulnerabilities they scan and potentially even exploit. Some something like Citrix bleed, Eventee, Fortinet. So this one, we need to have a closer look about these vulnerabilities. Okay. The tools and malwares we just we discovered. So we can see here the custom malwares on the left side. Most of it that what I already discussed, like GhostFitch, HPB IP, CaliMC2. All of this was, discovered, in their directories. Out of the shelf tools, something like AnyDesk, NUCly for runnable scanning, a lot of, open source, tools for scanning or, exfiltration. Then we saw also, the, the, DLLs manages, the, malware manages DLLs. The fm, app.dll was there as well. That sundry.net that we discussed, not using a blockchain. So all the the campaigns we just talked about, we saw in the directory as well. Now we have a a closer look of what they're doing. We can analyze this file in more depth and understand the target and the vulnerability and, what is their next move. We saw on the servers as well, there's Farsi, mesh history, so just this related to Iran. There's also overlap between muddy water and, kitten busters, leak that suggests that there's, a link or there's a, collaboration between the MIS and IRGC. Again, artificial intelligence development, they're using it a lot also in using emojis and their code and, the files that been exfiltrated and WhatsApp data in the directories. Here example of, key c two. And here you can see in the code, there's emoji. So this is one of the example I I mentioned that they're using AI's AI assisted, development. Based on the scans they did in these directories and we collected, you can see the target for the victims. And you can see, GCC is, clearly part of this, scans and exploitation. Now this is a screenshot from Hunters, a blog from Hunters, and they just also talk about the similar campaigns, but they did analysis about their their different phases from, their inside the machine doing reconnaissance, doing tunneling, doing account enumeration, user enumeration till they do, they reach to the c two phase. You you can see from reconnaissance to c two, it took them one hour on. So their hand hand on keyboard is like something, very known for muddy water using a lot of living, auto blend, tools. And and they're trying to, of course, to do innovation to find admin account, do privilege escalations. So, yeah, this is a good example that you can see how quickly they can reach to the t c two and they can communicate outside. I collected in this slide, all 12 different malware that have been used, like, in from '20 late twenty twenty five till till now, specifically targeting, MENA region. This we can share in the slides and you can have a look at it. It's just a summary about the malware used and the one we discovered. Okay. Now, we talk about techniques that we need to study, techniques we need to implement. So here, talk about the five campaigns we discussed previously. So, you can see the initial access prefishing, exploitation of public facing applications, valid accounts, and they use a lot of valid accounts. And that's something that we need to look at and make sure that the credential leaks, we have an eye on it. And we, fix it or we reset the passwords and make sure that, it's it's been trashed before the cert actor use it. We saw also execution, PowerShell, hands on keyboard, resistance using, registry run registry keys, defense evasion, so example of, like, evasion of, VMware. So evasion of sandboxing. C two, we saw the different technique like blockchain, and we saw also using Telegram, and then the exfiltration using, cloud storage or, or using tool like, reclone to do, exfiltration to to the cloud. So that's the one specifically for the campaigns we discussed. Now from, recorders recorded feature side, just from the platform, the screenshots. First, we can open just type muddy water. You can open intelligence card. You go go to the Mitre Navigator part, and you can select, for example, the high and the medium TTPs. And it can give you an overview of the most used TTP by this group. And that's something I highly recommend to do, and I recommend to, make sure that your detection are, can cover these techniques. Then the hunting packages on the right side, we have, smart sigma, yahoo rules that you can deploy in your ADR, SIM, your IPS. You do testing and make sure that these rules are, are firing properly. This is very important to do the testing. And, collective insights, basically, we do the integration with your SIM, with your different tool in your SOC. Whenever there's, a detection of one of the IPs, one of the hashes, one of the IOCs of muddy water, it will trigger an alert for the, CTI and and this is very important because now the CTI analyst right away, get notification, understand the threats in the SOC, and they can act on. And you can get more information about the campaign, what is this related to, how we can triage it, and all of that. The final example here is sandbox. So you can, for example, right, searching for submitted samples that one of the, Iranian water, barriers, and you get all the samples. And this amazing tool using in the red teaming. You can amazing to study it. Amazing. Even if there's no current error rule for a t or sigma rule, you can create all the error rule. We have this feature as well. Some mitigations. The first three mitigations here mainly focusing on recorded feature. So first is continuous monitoring. That's very important. You know, we know we all know that muddy water is targeting many regions, so we need to have an alert or, continue monitoring any campaigns they're doing, any new behavior, any TTPs. So we need to do that. We need to test, all their tools. It's very important. Then we need to ingest in the, in the feeds perspective or the integration perspective, and you can either alert on their IOCs or get block it on the perimeter, firewalls. Credential leak monitoring and serial logs, that very easy. Any set act can access and buy it, and they can, bypass your security control. Enforce multifactor authentication, especially on the, Outlook or web facing, application and, Microsoft three sixty five. And, of course, alert on high rate of authentication failure, in your in your SOC. Blockchain. Block the blockchain. Unless your business is related that you need to communicate somehow by blockchain. But if it's an application or there's no use for it, block it because it's been used by, Muddy Water. Monitor email for trusted account, and this is a little bit hard to to implement, because here, the the non email security will not detect this one, like, implementing SPF, DKIM, because, like, the example of a man, ministry, and then they're sending to a trusted, other ministries. So this one is hard, but you can, like, detect it based on an anomaly based, like, for example, in possible travel. If you know that your, one of your employees is based in UAE, then at the same time, you see another login from US, then this is something suspicious. This type of anomaly's behavior can really help in in this case. Patching of the vulnerabilities, specifically, the one that we found in the in the directory is really important to make sure it's patched. RMM tools, hunt for RMM tool, living off the land, abuse. We have a lot of actually ARR rules and SIGMA detecting specifically a living off the land, in recorded future. Block any, remote tools like any desk RMM tools unless there's really need for it in the business, implementing a DLP. And finally, macros, of course, there's known disable macros whenever possible. Train your users because this is a part that the phishing email is coming from muddy water, and train the user not to open, emails that is suspicious. And, use sandbox use sandbox to scan files to detect malicious behavior. Great. Now we'll talk about another campaign. Another third actor from Iran, and we, attribute we name him as tag one seven five. And, we see a link between this group and, cyber avenger because of, the behavior the the wiper behavior and, you know, it's Iranian actor and the use of, RabbitMQ, which is mess messaging queue system that's used by Cyber App Engine as well. So this is not just a a wiper. It's a some Go compiled malware, and it has, three modules. One is RET, a full on RET module, a wiper, and the ransomware as well. You can see this screenshot of the ransomware when it's launched against the victim. This is a screenshot from it. And we have, different detection in the platform. Your rule and different Sigma rules to detect this, wiper. So a little bit about this wiper. So it has, three different, destruction routines. The first one, wiping a non operating system physical drive, like, drive DE or whatever. And the other one is, wiping, Windows, operating system, drive. And the last one is system breaking where disable recovery and delete critical file to make sure the there's the, recovery is impossible. They're pre processing using, modifying registry key and, using scheduled task. Other capabilities of this, malware, screenshots, screen recording, opening a VMC remote control sessions, key logger, event log cleaning, and just to ensure that they can evade detection, from the logs sent to, for example, to the SIM. The initial access, is prefetching, and here you can see the different MITRE attacks we, we collected for this campaign. And use it. thank you, Apo. Aside from the Iranian threat actors, we've also seen a clear surge in the multinational state aligned espionage during the Iran conflict, leveraging war driven LERS to expand intelligence collection across the MENA region. One example that I wanna highlight here is, attributed by Lookout to an India aligned APT group, BITRE, conducting an espionage campaign targeting civil society members and potentially government officials in The Middle East. The infection begins with social engineering attack in social media, which, result in delivery of Android Spire. As you can see here, they also have the post buy. Another increase in activity is related to China Nexus threat groups, Camaro Dragon. Within one day of the launch of operation epic furry, checkpoint assess the camera Dragon attempted to deploy the Plugus backdoor using conflict theme blurs targeting Qatar. Plugus, enables a range of post compromise capabilities such as file exfiltration, screen capture, and remote command execution. The use of plug ins likely reflects an intent, to sustain the covert access for espionage operations. There are also a couple of campaigns, that were conducted by both known groups and previously unobserved actors with suspected attribution to China, Belarus, Pakistan, Hamas, that are targeting the Middle Eastern government and diplomatic entities. I wanna just, note here one example is coming from the Belarus aligned threat actor, t a four seventy three, who sent phishing emails containing an HTML, attachment, conducting HTTP requests to a URL that were likely intended for tracking purposes rather than delivering follow-up malicious payload. With the continued heightened activities from other nation state or threat actors who are leveraging the war for their own purpose, we highly recommend to have a multilayer defense, such as email hardening, using, conflict themed domains, threat hunting for known and newly emerging malware, and awareness for training, especially in the social engineering and phishing tactics. Here on the screen, you can see two high priority campaigns directly targeting the Gulf government. So these are sample of the screenshot. You can see here on the left, we have here UNK inner ambush, which is a suspected China aligned threat actor who used phishing email linking to a Google Drive URL, which hosted a password protected ZIP or RAR name strike at gulfoil.zip. The loader ran assigned executable vulnerable to DLL side loading, which loaded a malicious DLL to decrypt COBOL strike and inject it into memory. Here on the right side is another example, for a Hamas aligned t a four zero two for an email credential phishing campaign using a compromised Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs account. The embedded URL impersonated Microsoft Outlook web application and based on IP geolocation, selectively serve a decoy PDF, or a credential harvesting page. Okay. Great. Thank you, Stephanie. Now we're moving to hacktivist and, and we also have much activist, like, been very noisy and, trying different destruction to and support, their vision, the political vision, during the war. Can see the first two, Handla and Nasr Security Group. They're linked to Iran or proxy like Nasr Group is a proxy rate to Iran. They're in the phase three of, influence operation. Other groups are, mainly focused on the life service or or, the life service and leaks. And they're the, like, the eight groups that we saw the most targeting, MENA region specifically. Just look look at the hacktivist threat landscape. So there's three types of attacks the hacktivist are operating on. The first, the denial of service, and on one, defacement of, public facing assets. Hack and leak, which have vapor like ransomware. And the last one is destructive and wiping. Then we saw also a lot of use of denial, DDoS as a service. So this basically if someone have an agenda or doesn't have much, political agenda, doesn't have much of a technical skill to run these attacks, this, Lidos as a service, can be very easy to use. Like, for example, they have deemed, a tool that doing layer layer four to layer seven type of, lineup service using a massive, botnets and and been advertised actually on the Telegram by the group three one three. So this can be do massive destruction and massive, noise to your assets and, with a very low skilled actors. So it's really, really dangerous, easy, and the price of it is not, expensive to acquire. Again, so the activists, like, the evolution of activists not only focus on denial of service. They're also doing hack and leak wiping. And most importantly, their aim is, psychological pressure and and put, your organization on the country reputation at risk. Media application, of course, they're they have different channel from from, social media, Telegram, even dark web. They they want to make it look bigger, exaggeration, false information in in their, in their posts. Let's look at, recorded feature, how we detect denial, denial of service traffic. And this one of our proprietary method that we use. So this is how I were able to discover that there's more than 50% increase before the war till now. And we saw more than 50 government and enterprise organization, MENA, were directly impacted or at least we saw the traffic so that this were it's not just a claim on Telegram or on, on x saying we've been able to take down ministry x. No. This traffic we actually saw, and validated. So, basically, we know, like, this the technique here we'll use, we know the botnets, are used globally. We we see the Internet traffic. We have our signature, like, different related to different line of service technique. We combine all of that. We correlate all of that, and we provide it in the platform. So here, for an ascent, you can see the blue box here, the type of attack we discovered, which, the, DNS amplification, line of service impacting the DNS, and the list of IPs that were scanning at the same time. This is just a list. There's bigger list of it. Just we we keep it to 20 here. And the victim on the orange box, which is a red two digital, Dubai Digital Authority for that. This is really important to discover and and and to validate basically, the line the line of service attacks happening in the region. Moving to handler group. Infamous group and was very active during this war. It's linked to MOS, Ministry of Intelligence of Iran. You can see here the the victims are the claimed victims and the file been breached, claimed for this organization in Dubai, Saudi, Jordan. And most of it is related to energy government, which is critical, to the country, of course. And the one that to, Jordan, this wasn't the beginning of the war, related to gas station systems. Also, we saw handler leaking FBI, head FBI data, and and this maybe can was a motivator to seize some of the handler domains, but, of course, they will they regenerate the new domains for their operation and their blocks. And there's, 10,000,000 bounty for, who who lead to information about, the handler operators. Just quickly on looking at the kill chain and understand how they operate handler. Starting by initial access, they use compromised VPN, storing credentials, supply chain attack as a initial access. Then they do credentials theft, enumeration, and they do, privilege escalation using l s, l s s dump and using registry hive, using tools, like AD Recon for reconnaissance. They use lateral movement. They use hand on RDP, NetBird, WMIC to do, lateral movement. Their staging is, using, group policy, script to, like, widen the, the impact to many machines in the organization using a scheduled task for, for, for resistance and wmc to make sure that the some of the running malicious processes are dropping without, running without dropping a malware. Then the the wiper itself. So there there's multiple wipers or multiple techniques they use. One for Windows here named, HATIF for Windows, another one named Hamsa for Linux. They sometimes also use another, one built by AI, a wiper you build by AI using open source tool like VeraCrypt, and sometimes they do deletion using RDP. We have also insect reports. Our search team reports, talking about this campaign and talking in-depth about, the detection hunting tips. So you can see here that these are the directories, that they use to, for in their operation that we need to monitor. We need to also to look at, the auto lot, auto auto, abuse, which is basically a legitimate scripting tool, that the use we need to monitor, this tool. Rig s m .xe also, if we see that there's, it's running without arguments or, and, XE running to, a c two or outbound connection, this can be anomalous as well. We look at high volume of deletion at at the same time or, related specifically to, like, system files and, DLLs and XE. This can be also a behavior that we need to look at. Also, you can build a a sigma rule if you have, like, if you have samples of of this malware, and on the using malware intelligence. Another thing here is looking at the DNS lookup for, like, for domain for domains like, IP API because this how they look at where the host are located, the geolocation of the host. And finally, we have different PR rules that, to Hotif and the other one, that you can implement right away from, the platform. Moving to Nasdaq Security Group. So this, pro Iranian threat actor is highly linked to Hezbollah, you know, the Iranian proxy. They're targeting VC energy infrastructure. They've been active recently since October 2025. You Can see the victims or the leaked files, here in the sectors and all over the region, government, and recently, the way airport was one of the victims as well. Here, the TTPs will discover spoofing, impersonation, public facing exploitation, And there's a couple of things in their in their, claims on their blog that it's, exaggerated claims. That's really like, for example, the amount of data that have been exfiltrated or the exaggerated. Also here, I'm not sure if it's clear, but the third line in Arabic here is mentioning that whoever, whoever can prove that we are in the DXB, Dubai Airport, network, we're gonna pay him, 50,000, dollars as a reward. And this they're playing on that, that, they have the the confident they are very confident that they are inside the network, and they make it look like, more, trustworthy that, that they are inside the network. There's also around 1,000 files but been, posted in their blog right to the XBee. And they're they're Iranian proxy, as I said, and they're they're cyber arm for their, IO, includes operation, for Iran. Another group that was also very active, especially against GC countries immunization, almost every day, there is a post on their Telegram, which I had to mention is a team. There is North African hackers, and, their claims mainly is, type of denial of service, and they have the host checker to, check, the validation of, the target. Here one of the examples read to Qatar and Bahrain and all the, GC country as well. Finally, for the hacktivist, here is another example because I want to show also we are we are not mounting only or their channels. It's not only on Telegram and social media. This example on on breach forum, dark web forum. And, this forum, they're they're basically leaking not selling. They're leaking information about IoT device in Saudi. And you can see here, clearly dimension to be used for proxies and to leverage the line of service operation against the countries in GSC. And this is also one of the hacktivist in, in the in the in this forum. So, yeah, this one something you need maybe to add in in your monitoring list as well. Finally, just defender preparation. I will try to go quickly on this one. So you need to look at any spikes in HTTP, DNS traffic. You need to look at login attempt, specific for admin portals that might lead to, a defacement. Need to look at any exploitation, trial exploit exploitation on the web application, scanning of your assets. If you saw a scanning of your asset and your API endpoint, this can all be a detection to, the live service or defacement. What action you can take, you can monitor Telegram forums, social media for, any mention of organization. So when we record the official, we have alert. We can set it for you, and it will monitor whenever your your company or your even third party or any any entity in your country want to want to have been a part of the the life service or mentioned as a life service, you can get notified in real time. The commission unused, public services, and this is very important because sometimes you have testing servers or servers that you're maybe not aware of all servers. So having attack surface management, this can give you the full, attack surface for your organization. Super important. And and because of a testing server been compromised, maybe there's no strong security controls on it, then the hacktivist will make it look like, we'll be able to, like, hack into this government important entity. Apply web application patches. So, again, what is important? For in terms of patching, this is something, really important to have vulnerability intelligence to give you the prioritize the most important, relevant vulnerabilities to patch. Then other security console like implementing, DDoS protection via CDN, maintain, backup, deploying WAF, and very important to have clear communication plan to ensure the customer, are at risk for false claims. Sometimes if the claims are really big and been propagating through social media, sometimes the best action here is to actually post that this is a false claim to make sure that your customers, your clients are assured that this is a false claim. Credential leaks, which is used a lot in in in the method as well. So you need to look at in the socket repeated, failure of logins, unusual geolocation logins, multifactor authentication fatigue. We have a very wide and very strong, collection of credential leaks and malware security feature, which basically can give you all the list of, of credential leaks that and still I'm aware that before even it's been sold on the markets that can be bought by these cyber criminals. We provide you this, information in the platform, and you can also automate it. It. You can, having a playbook to automate it to reset the password for the user. Finding the leak, you need to look at large outbound traffic. Documents been, there's access to your repository documents, for example. Big amount of, archiving of files, using some tools like ArtOne and similar tools to, explore to the cloud. Terms of action you can take, you need to monitor data leak. And, this is, something you can set in the platform to monitor all the data leaks, through dark web and other, forums. Implementing DLP, restrict external cloud storage unless it's needed for the business, monitoring large, outbound traffic. And, again, clear communication, this can be a very important, next action for the business to take. With phishing campaigns and conflict theme blurs, we've seen there was a research coming from Bitdefender that we've seen a high increase of 130% on average. There's malicious emails targeting The Middle East compared to pre war levels. As you can see on the screen here on the top, we saw a surge in phishing activities targeting various sectors with domains frequently impersonating reputable companies and organizations in the MENA region such as Dubai Police, Aramco, and Qatar Post. So the one on the top is coming from recorded feature phishing detection. At the bottom here as well is you can see the new domain registrations. Thousands of domains having patterns such as war, Middle East war, stop the war are newly registered. And although this can indicate a platform for both legitimate news dissemination, it can well be used as well for target for misinformation campaigns or cyber operations aimed at destabilizing the region, influencing public opinion, or are likely to be weaponized. We've also seen here, a couple a couple of samples of the conflict theme blurs. So tons of the phishing campaigns are tailored to real world, workflows in the region, such as the banking or financial ops, shipping and delivery, contracts and ministry, account verification access. As you can see here, two samples, on the screen. Some of the analyzed phishing emails hide malicious payload with heavily obfuscated codes, uses visual deception, and gain persistence. A big caveat here is that these observers are not tied to any attribution at this time, but could be linked to opportunistic cybercriminal, financially motivated threat actors, or any threat actors leveraging current events for social engineering. Another example here of war themed blurs as well, you can see on the first two images is a ride alert espionage campaign, exploits wartime panic by distributing a trojanized version of the official alert app via SMS phishing, bypassing the Google Play Store, and tricking users into sideloading a malicious APK. The malware mimics the legitimate app, deploying a multi stowage infection, which evades, Android protection, steals, SMS, contacts, and GPS data, and it filtrates it to the attacker's infrastructure. Another lure here on the right side, is a great example. This is coming from a threat actor who delivered an archive, this guide, as photos of attacks on American bases in Bahrain. When executed, an l and k file from the archive starts an unusually long infection chain and deploy plug s back store. So if you can see, this was attributed as well to a suspected China Nexus threat actor group that I have, mentioned earlier. Now we're down to the last slide with a big, with a big question. What's next? Although we're in the midst of a ceasefire, the situation in Iran is moving fast. Strategically, cyber remains a key asymmetric capability for Iran. If the new leadership follows the strategies of communist era, we are likely to see retaliatory and destructive cyberattacks in the near term. So how can report recorded future help? So recorded feature can help with the continuous monitoring of the latest geo geopolitical and cyber threats. The in sync group are up to date with all of what's happening in the region. We can also stay on top with the TTPs and IOCs to help detect and deny course of actions together with proactive hunting and integrations. Last but not the least, timely report and dissemination to customers and executives. Thank you, everyone. This is the last slide for, the webinar today. Thank you for your time, everyone. I hope it was useful. Have a great day.