Video: 2024 Annual Threat Landscape: Strategic Implications for European Organisations | Duration: 3332s | Summary: 2024 Annual Threat Landscape: Strategic Implications for European Organisations | Chapters: Introducing 2024 Threat Landscape (5.44s), Key Cybersecurity Trends (186.375s), Identity Security Challenges (1048.17s), AI-Driven Cybercrime Evolution (1469.27s), Ransomware Risk Profile (2139.5s), Executive Targeting Trends (2379.2249s), OT Security Challenges (2527.715s), Incident Response Strategies (2804.785s), Wrap-Up and Reflections (3021.075s)
Transcript for "2024 Annual Threat Landscape: Strategic Implications for European Organisations":
Hi, everyone. Thank you so much for joining us today for our webinar to unpack our 2024 annual threat landscape report, from our research team, Insikt. This is always one of my favorite reports of the year because it gives a really great look back at what's happened, predictions for potential trends we think we might see this year, and even reflects on how our predictions from prior years turned out. And I'm really excited for this session so that we can dig in more to the challenges that we're seeing and hearing from organizations across Europe. Some of these have not only been discussed in our reporting, but also in the World Economic Forum's twenty twenty five cybersecurity outlook report. Specifically, that regulatory fragmentation is significantly hampering organizations' abilities to stay compliant. Geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions like Ukraine that have exposed vulnerabilities in Europe's critical infrastructure. The complexity of global supply chains, which I feel like we started hearing about fairly recently, like a couple of years ago and has only become more and more prevalent. And finally, a persistent shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals. With all this in mind, we really wanted to bring together this stellar panel of experts to share with you the findings from the report and have an interactive discussion around the implications for organizations in Europe. My name is Meghan, and I'm gonna be your moderator for today. And I'll be fielding all of your questions. This is gonna be a really collaborative session. So please submit your questions and we'll get to as many of them as we can. But I'm gonna let our panelists introduce themselves starting with another Megan, then Jason, and then Serge. Thank you, Megan. I'm Megan. I'm on Recorded Futures Insikt Group as a senior threat intelligence analyst. I led the effort to compile, reported future data as well as, salient insect research from the year to put together our six key trends that we're going to talk about today. Looking forward to presenting that. Let me follow that, Megan, by introducing myself. My name is Jason Stear. I'm the chief information security officer at Recorded Future. And my name is Serge Palladino. I'm a principal technical account manager with the EMEA advisory services team. I've been with Recorded Future for three and a half years working with over a dozen enterprise customers across various industry verticals, And our job is to really provide consultancy consultancy services to our customers to help ensure they're not only getting the very most out of Recorded Future, but also to help drive their CTI program. Awesome. Thank you guys so much. So in terms of agenda today, Megan is gonna kick us off first by sharing an overview of the report and those key trends. And then we're gonna jump into questions for the panelists. So like I said, drop your questions in the q and a, and we'll get to as many of them as possible. We really do want to make this as interactive of a session as we can. With that, over to you, Megan. Great. Thank you. Let me share my screen. K. Great. So we're gonna go through our six key trends from the 2024 annual report. This is going to focus primarily on the trends, and I wanna save our discussion on the outlook and potential mitigations that we can use to address these threats, for our discussion with Jason and Serge. So we have a lot to cover and not a lot of time, so let's kick off the first trend. The first trend that we noted is that the cost of credential theft is higher than ever. And this is a result of a couple of key factors that are, merging to produce this threat. First is just an increased reliance on software as a service applications. Since 2021, really since the increased virtualization of a lot of workplaces, we've seen an increase in SaaS applications, not only in number, but in these essential business functions that these applications do for our enterprises. At the same time, this has also helped contribute to an increase, in info stealer activity or information stealing malware. And in addition to prevalence on devices, we've also seen an increase in the number of credentials stolen. And this kind of makes sense going along with the increase in SaaS applications. Right? There's more applications. More user logins are needed, to access these applications. In addition to seeing the increase in credentials stolen, we've also seen an increase, in the proportion of personal devices compared to enterprise devices. This is relevant to enterprises, of course, because not only do people tend to access corporate devices from their personal phones, which are, less well monitored, tend to have fewer defenses, but they also tend to reuse passwords as well. These two trends coming together contributed to a number of high profile breaches in 2024. And I wanna talk a lot about the Snowflake breach, which Snowflake is a, cloud data storage platform, where, in 2024, threat actors are able to access and exert, openly sell data for at least a 65 reported victims. These victims' credentials were stolen via Infostealers, some going as far back to 2020, so showing the lingering tail of these info stealer infections. These breaches had a number of things in common. One is a lack of multifactor authentication that allowed threat actors to more easily abuse these stolen credentials, having fewer barriers in place to getting access to information. Of course, in Snowflake as well, there is also, customized malware that once the threat actors didn't get into the Snowflake instance, they deployed that malware to, elevate privileges and further access very sensitive data. Another contributing factor to the identity threat is misconfigured single sign on. Many enterprises use single sign on to manage this identity attack attack surface and this increased number of software as a service applications. However, it's not always perfect. It's difficult to make sure that you are managing all of your SaaS applications under one single sign on, and this can also be misconfigured as well to either allow over elevated privileges or otherwise allow access to data that individuals should not have access to. And so these factors are contributing to the fact that 77% of web app credentials, or web app attacks, were exploited using stolen credentials. So our next threat looks at trends in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and we we saw as a shift to tactics that allow threat actors to hide in plain sight. Comparing, at the high level MITRE tactics between the two years, we saw some of the biggest increases in not only defense evasion but also discovery. And discovery is really useful if you are trying to operate within plain sight using native processes, abusing native tools on the, on the enterprise. You need to know what's already there. And so discovery techniques really help threat actors be able to do that in order to use native tools or native processes for lateral movement, exfiltration, etcetera. One tactic that we noticed increased significantly this year is the exploitation of remote management tools. So these are tools that are pretty essential, especially in a distributed and virtualized environment. However, it's their use case is pretty plain for a threat actor to take advantage of as well to gain access and control in a device. We've seen these them abuse these in a number of ways. The first, valid credentials, which we talked about on the last slide, of course. This is how threat actors were able to gain access to, change health care's enterprise and conduct that exploit. We also saw vulnerability exploitation through taking advantage of a vulnerability in the ScreenConnect software. And then finally, social engineering is another tactic that threat actors can use. The help desk scam is where a threat actor attempts to trick a victim into downloading a remote management tool, whether it is a spoofed tool or it is a legitimate version of the tool that the threat actor controls. They attempt to trick the victim to downloading that. And from there, they gain access to their machine and can pivot out to other valuable resources. And, again, this is where that discovery can really come in handy because you're able to find out which, remote management tools would not be detected, amongst legitimate activity on a device. So our next trend looks at, law enforcement and criminal behavior. So 2024 was a really big year for law enforcement takedowns, and I wanna focus especially on the takedown of LockBit. LockBit was hugely prolific prior to February 2024, accounting for still 34 attacks 34% of all attacks in h one of 2024 and twenty two percent of all attacks in 2023. So massive player. In February of twenty twenty four, we saw a coalition of law enforcement, including from The United Kingdom and The United States, not only carry out arrest but also seize cryptocurrency assets and take down infrastructure. However, since FoxBit was taken down, we've seen a proliferation of new threat actor groups take their place. We've seen 44 new variants observed in October alone and 72 new variants observed in the entire second half of 2024. This is compared to 2023 where we only saw 32 new variants for the entire year. And these new variants were active. They carried out extortion attacks that were roughly about the same rate as we observed in 2023. The good news behind this is these groups do not appear to be as effective as some of the bigger affiliates like LockBit or LFE who also, dissolved early in 2024. If you look at cryptocurrency payouts between 2023 and '20 or even the first half of twenty twenty four and the second half, there's been a significant decrease in the amount of money transmitted to ransomware operators, which is a good sign that these groups are less effective. Unfortunately, we've also seen that big game hunting remains alive and well. We saw a $75,000,000 ransom payment paid out in July of twenty twenty four. This was paid to a group called Dark Angels attacking a Fortune 500 company, demonstrating that threat actors are still able to, extort very high payments from their victims. Our analysis on industry trends show some ways that threat actors attempt to do this. For the third year running, we've seen manufacturing claim the dubious title of being the industry most targeted by extortion claims. And this is for a number of reasons that are relatively unique to manufacturing but are also shared in part by other industries. We see a very low tolerance for downtime. It can be not only very expensive but also physically disruptive to downstream supply chains depending on what is hit and could even potentially put physical safety at risk, again, depending on the operational technology systems that are hit. In addition to the increased consequences of manufacturing being hit, we've also seen the impacts of inconsistent network segmentation that give threat actors more opportunity. Often in this industry, although this is getting better, defenders don't necessarily know where their IT and OT systems connect and whether or not their OT systems are truly walled off from the open Internet. As a result, threat actors are assuming that this would manufacturing companies would result in a higher likelihood of payout if an extortion claim is made. Pivoting to other types of cybercrime, we can look at posts on criminal forums that show where threat actors are interested in exploiting, beyond extortion. We've seen, a continued prevalence of initial access brokers who are offering, access to different companies and services, for either extortion attacks or data exfiltration. And data exfiltration or database sales, which is that second line down, has seen one of the most notable increases in in these sales with consumer goods and retail being the number one most impacted industry here. Databases are highly useful for fraud, which is a rapidly increasing crime that's enabled, by the Internet. We've seen multibillions of dollars in fraud and personal data, especially specialized personal data like those stolen from health care companies or telecommunications companies, can be used to enable threat actors to carry out other crimes. K. So we'll wrap up today by talking about some trends in state sponsored attacks before we turn back to the panel. We've seen increasing global tensions drive attacks on critical infrastructure. Notably, in February 2024, we've seen The US, make, put out a statement that Chinese state sponsored threat actor group, Bolt Typhoon, which is associated with the Chinese military, is pre positioning on US critical infrastructure networks. And this is distinct from kind of past espionage activity that The US has observed, Chinese state sponsored actors carrying out as these attacks are specifically intended for, disruption of utilities, electricity, and infrastructure. And, obviously, there's a lot of points of tension between The US and China, notably around territorial expansion in both the South China Sea as well as in Taiwan. Coming closer to home in Europe, we can see this play out, especially in Ukraine. We've seen a lot of, very directly implicated cyberattacks corresponding with the, kinetic warfare activity, going on in that active conflict, but we've also seen activity that is, less directly aligned, to a specific state carried out against critical infrastructure in Europe. Specifically, we've seen a lot of hacktivists aligned with Russian interest disrupting operational technology in Europe, through cyber means. We've also seen an increase in physical disruption as well. We've seen a number of attacks against critical infrastructure entities, including factories, that involve relatively low sophistication but highly disruptive attacks such as arson. And these are important because they add a layer of deniability that these attacks are not aligned to any state because they're being carried out by these, third party groups. Another disruptive activity that we've seen in increases of is, of course, potential attempts to disrupt cables, in the Baltic Sea. Again, these are carried out with that same level of deniability using ships with different flags, carrying out activity that could be plausibly spun as an accident. And then finally was observed in the looking at The Middle East, we've seen actually a relative decrease particularly coming from Iran in terms of disruptive cyberattacks against, or cyberattacks that have a destructive impact or attempting to have a destructive impact against Israel and Israel's allies. But we have also this is likely due to, geopolitical factors impacting Iran, notably multiple setbacks against Iran and their proxies over the course of 2024. So finally, I'd like to wrap up our discussion on, state sponsored activities with a look at how generative AI has allowed malign influences to scale. We've seen, Iran, China, and, Russia all use adopt generative AI into their influence operations, notably Russia, in using, deep fakes and known personas to imitate not only local news, affiliates, but also, whistleblowers and kind of lesser known journalists to spread pro Russian narratives, most recently in the German elections that happened, earlier this week. We've also noted Iranian activity still trying to stoke cultural divisions in Israel by using, coordinated and authentic engagement to impersonate, various sides of cultural divides in Israel with the end goal of attempting to bring Israelis into this online conflict. Then finally, we've noticed a proliferation of activity coming from China as well, specifically in generating content in multiple languages. Chinese information operations have been observed in at least 40 different countries, using both negative narratives as well as positive pro Chinese narratives as well. So that is our whirlwind tour of our, 2024 annual report, and I'm excited to turn it back over to Meghan and our panel to go into more detail. Awesome. Thanks so much, Meghan. And I'm starting to see some questions coming through already, so please keep them coming. I'm gonna, we have a couple of, like, kind of categories that we're gonna go through and discuss, so I'll try and weave in, the audience's questions with that as well. But first, I kinda wanted to talk a little bit about, you know, identity. It was one of the first topics, and, again, you covered. And, Jason, in the past, you and I have had quite a few conversations about the importance of identity management. And I think, actually, when you posted this report on LinkedIn, that was the kind of, like, fact that you called out. So I'd love to understand from your perspective, how are your conversations around identity security shifting, and are there barriers you're seeing to implementing best practices? Oh, lots to talk about there, Megan. So, you know, I think, you know, the important part of the report that, you know, everyone on the call, you know, probably wants to take away from here is, you know, what does our exposure to identity threat look like today? Because, you know, you can't respond or fix something you don't have any knowledge of. And, I think that's the hardest part that organizations have got so many other competing priorities in their security program today that they probably just feel overwhelmed and not capable of taking on yet another source of data that, you know, overwhelms their IT, their security teams to have to deal with. So, but, you know, why it's so important? You know, in face stealing malware is a really interesting problem. I've been lucky enough to look at this data now for the last three and a half years. And, you know, the volume of infra stealer malware families has evolved significantly from the three that I remember looking at back in 2021. I I wanna say October 21. And today, I think we're our AI tool this morning told me that we've got over 20 infested malware families that we're tracking right now. So, reality is is organizations have got credentials, have got authentication cookies, authentication keys exposed from devices that are infected that essentially enables an attacker to log in without authentication key or cookie without any additional multifactor authentication prompt. So when we think about how organizations are deploying zero trust architecture, you know, this this is really a, arrow that, you know, pulls apart that principle. And, you know, that's why it's important to call out the you know, do we have visibility of exposed identities? And if we don't, you know, is it worth us rethinking? Now how would we validate if we have exposed credentials today in infestealer malware families? And secondly, you know, how do we go about mitigating that? And that now is something that we've been working really hard on, which is that we can't just fire alerts over to the SOC and say, hey. Review this device because they they're already overwhelmed. So thinking about, does my identity access management tool, you know, whether it's Azure, whether it's Okta, whether it's other, you know, leading IDP IIM tools out there, is can we can we do things in real time to mitigate this risk? And, you know, I think that's the ideal state of where we get to, but I think the lot the a lot of the problem we have in organizations is is not the willingness to do this, but, you know, acceptance that you know, does the I I I am to actually have the ability to do some of these more advanced features right now and accepting that, you know, on their investment life cycle, they might have to wait another year or two before they actually get funding to improve and update their investments as well. So, that doesn't mean that you can't go and validate that you have a problem, and I think that's probably one of the takeaways for everyone on the call, which I'd encourage you to do is just go and get a measurement, get an assessment of what your exposure looks like over the last two or three weeks or last month, and just, you know, get a measure of that and determine whether you think that's significant problem for you or not. And validate whether you actually do have devices connecting to your environment or you have contractors or subcontractors who've got credentials to your business that are infected that you have no visibility of. So I'll I'll leave it there. But as you can tell, I mean, there's a lot to unpack on here that there are reasons why there isn't as as much progress as we like, but, you know, the the advantage still remains on the attacker side right now. No. I think that's that's a great point. Thanks, Jason. I think that actually pivots really well into a question for Serge, which would be, you know, in your conversations that you're having with clients as they come to us, like, what types of conversations are clients bringing up around their identity concerns as well? Yeah. Sure, Meghan. You know, when I speak to my clients, what I often hear is, you know, oh, we found another info stealer on a BYOD device. And so we we tend to see this more often on these sorts of personal devices where folks are mixing their personal life with their work life. That's not to say we wouldn't see info stealers on corporate devices, but we we tend to see them more on BYOD devices. And aside from the obvious phishing attack factor, oftentimes, what happens is folks are downloading applications that seem benign but are otherwise delivering steelware steelware on unbeknownst to the end user. But I think it's important to note that it's not only your own employees that you need to worry about. And and just to share, like, a a client story, what you know, one of one of my customers recently shared something interesting with us. You know? Using our identity intelligence module, the customer was alerted to some exposed employee credentials. And after some further investigation, the client discovered the issue based on the additional context that we can provide through identity intelligence. So it's not just the credentials. We're providing a lot more context here. And so in this case, it was the authorization URL that gave it away, which clearly identified the vendor in question. And my my customer my customer contacted the vendor to notify them, and it was discovered that the exposed the exposed employee credentials were compromised as a result of an admin sheet admin, machine info Infostealer infection where the credentials were stored to access the vendor portal. And, shockingly, the vendor was completely unaware of the problem until they were notified. So it's quite a powerful example of how you need to monitor not only your own organization, but sometimes that of your supply chain. And then we talk about other actions to consider. That's that's big at Recorded Future. You know? What can we do about this? So we talk about, you know, actions considered like running threat hunts to detect presence of Infostealer malware in your environment. And, also, of course, it goes without saying, but education awareness is so important. Education educating your end users on the latest phishing campaigns and the importance of of downloading, you know, quest questionable software. And in the workplace, only approved applications should be installed to prevent these, stealer infections from happening in the first place. Awesome. I'd actually really like to pivot from this to, like, kind of ransomware and the kind of, like, future of cybercrime. I'm seeing a lot of questions come in on the chat with that. And I think the first one, it would be really good for for you, Meghan, which is, are you seeing cybercrime groups specializing more on specific parts of the kill chain? And do we see any increased collaboration between different groups? Yeah. Thank you. Great question. We have seen specialization for sure, and that actually goes back to one of the charts that I, showed on, on the ransomware side looking at that, initial access broker data. So that is an example of criminal specialization, by having one set of criminals, who specialize in gaining access and then selling access to criminals who will then carry out the extortion. So that specialization has certainly been occurring. Although, as you could see this year, we've seen a bit of a drop in the prevalence of initial access brokers. And, it may be a little soon to kind of see why it may still be part of the fallout, for example, from taking down some of these bigger affiliates and pivoting to kind of these smaller, groups with a little bit limited more limited, brand recognition. But I think that we will still continue to see, groups take on different aspects of the kill chain. I'd also kind of I'd like to bring an AI to this as well, because we have seen groups, increasingly transparently with, the emergence of FunkSec back in December, incorporate a, generative AI into their code development and code updates so they're continuously able to kind of change up, and more easily change up some of their malware code. So I think this is another kind of aspect of the specialization point where it's bringing, lower skilled actors the capability to do higher skilled, and higher sophistication attacks. That's actually another question that I see here in the chat, which is are we observing any indications of AI driven cyberattacks in the current threat landscape? So you kinda gave one example. Are there any others that we're observing that you wanna bring up as well? Yeah. We've also and we've seen, primarily in augmentation of existing, activities. So we've seen not only in code development like I've discussed, but we've also seen examples of AI being used for reconnaissance, for that kind of discovery aspect as well to help threat actors plan out their attacks. And this is not just for criminals. We've also, seen evidence that state sponsored actors do this as well and, going basically doing helping them with their research, and looking at critical infrastructure targets. So primarily augmentation at this point. Makes sense. There was a second part to this question, which I guess could be for maybe Jason or Serge as well, which is how effective are the current defensive measures in keeping pace with these evolving AI based threats? Yes. Let let's be cynical. They probably aren't in many regards, Meghan. Now we're actually going back to Meghan other just previous comments about AI. I did wanna encourage, people to read the Open Eye OpenAI report on how, nation states or actors are using their platform because there's some really strong takeaways that Meghan covered off. But, you know, one of the funniest things that and it made me laugh out of the most the report, maybe twelve months ago, was how one, I think it was North Korean group was using it to improve their dot net code. And, now who would have guessed? People don't need better dot net better dot net code. Everyone does whether you're a threat actor or not. So, I think, you know, this this just shows the, you know, the the fine line of how AI is beneficial in so many ways, but in the wrong hands, unfortunately, is is a powerful weapon rather than a powerful advocate for good. Detecting better code, and it's a good thing for everyone, unfortunately, whether the intent of that code is good or bad, and that is very, very difficult to to understand. I think, you know, the phishing, you know, for me remains the biggest one because phishing remains such a a threat vector that is, you know, impossible to stop and is entirely reliant on our end users to do the right thing. Entirely reliant on r n g's to do the right thing. And, you know, with the quality of translation from Russian or simplified Chinese or Iranian into English now is the quality of phishing emails means that threat actors don't have to use translators and spend extra money now. You know, it removes a step in the process, which means, you know, the whole delivery cycle of threats speeds up a little bit potentially. And the clues now I can remember twenty years ago when I used to work at IronPort. We we'd know that spam in Germany was was never spam because there was no spam written in German. So, you know, some of these simple clues are starting to dis disappear now. And, then when we rely on end users to do the right thing, unfortunately, we know because of variety of reasons human beings are not reliable is whether it's clicking on an email, accepting a file via Teams, whether it's, reporting something that looks suspicious. We know that that doesn't happen a %. So there there will always remain gaps. You know, AI is gonna get to. And I think maybe in a minute, we'll get to some of the things that we're gonna should be worried about around fraud and payments and things like that. Yeah. Absolutely. Actually, there's one question here, also for you, Jason, that I had already planned to ask you and someone else asked it as well, which is about kind of like, the European Union's government stances on ransomware payments and how we kind of, like, see that impacting organizations. But the second part of it was, this person was asking what's behind firms' decisions whether to make ransomware payments, and how often does it even result in a satisfactory outcome for them? Yes. Some the dance with the devil and, you know, you you end up with some very unintended consequences, unfortunately, specifically with ransomware actors. You know, criminals, so they you can't rely on them to be, you know, dependable, can we? No. I think whether you, you know, look at the EU position on ransomware payments, which is a discouraging payment, We look at the new recent UK proposals around targeting bans on ransomware payments of public sector and critical national infrastructure, and the same in Australia. And other countries hopefully are gonna be adopting this as well, which is yeah. Are we gonna pay it or not? Should are we allowed to pay it or not? And I mean, US as well, you know, we see, you know, lots of discussion about should organizations pay. And at the end of the day, it's a business decision. It it really is no more than that. And then we've talked in our business about, you know, what's the threshold of what could we pay and what would we not pay. I'm not gonna disclose that, but, you know, I think every organization should have that conversation, which is what is our ceiling for what we could afford to pay if we were in the situation. But, you know, if the most critical data system and its backups have been encrypted, have been stolen, and it's a cost of 5,000,000 to a ransomware group to get your data back and get back up and running in twelve hours or twenty four hours versus waiting for a week or two weeks for ransomware negotiators to potentially get your data back. There is it's a it's a revenue decision at the end of the day. And, some businesses like, you know, that organization that paid 75,000,000, it's it's a it's a business decision. And, you know, you know, what insurance may cover some of the cost. The business may cover some of the cost. And, you know, yeah, it it's a really difficult one. It it would depend on the business model of the organization and, you know, what the impact of the system or systems impact it is and how long it's gonna take to recover. And, that's the finger in the air moment, unfortunately, which is, well, it depends. And, that that's really where the security team is through response to ransomware negotiators and the ransomware group itself. You know? You know, we'll figure it out in real time. And, it's a horrible situation to be in. Now I I fortunately haven't had to be in that situation, but I certainly have worked with a few colleagues who have. And, I think that the worst part of this is the unintended consequence of paying it once, hoping to get all your data back, hoping that the decryptor works successfully, and there's no guarantees on that. There's lots of lots of evidence that the decryptors are somewhat flaky, and, you know, why there are other decryptor organizations that that are much more reliable we we should be using if there is a decryptor available. And, you know, it really is simple of, you know it seems silly to say it, but, you know, getting back to the basics. So, you know, strong multifactor authentication, authentication, patching. And but the trouble is they're still not working. And, you know, that this is this is the impossible question that keeps us all paid, gives us all gray hair and sleepless nights that that that will remain entry points where persistent groups who have a motivation to target organizations can operate at speed and a level of patience waiting for opportunities to to appear. Yeah. I think those are really good points. Did you have something, Meghan? Yeah. I just actually wanted to, dig in a little more to a point that Jason made kind of based on the dual trends that we're seeing of not only more groups coming up, but also the fewer payments, which kind of shows ironically how important that trust is that criminals need to build their brand in order to deliver payouts. And so, if you don't think that your information is going to be decrypted, if you don't think they're actually going to give it back or not expose it, you're not going to pay out the ransom. So it's ironically making groups less effective at getting payments if people don't know who they are and don't believe them that they will actually get their data back. That's fascinating. Ironic, isn't it, that criminals actually have to think about their brand and their legacy to ensure that they do get paid. And, they've yeah. Who you know, even paying with Bitcoins these days seems pretty unreliable based on the news of this week as well. Very true. I'd be very remiss if I didn't ask, you, Serge, how we're, like, seeing clients in Europe using threat intelligence, to address the ransomware problem. But I am gonna tack on another question that came in through the chat, which is because I think it's related, is beyond threat hunting, how can RecordedFuture actually help organizations with identity based attacks and alerts? Sure. Sure. Yeah. So, so first of all, we recognize that ransomware is a very big problem, and it's not going away anytime soon. Even with, you know, the law enforcement disruption that we've seen is still a major problem. It feels like, you know, we're constantly playing whack a mole with this. But we do have a solution, and our solution has been to create a tool where we can actually monitor activity across the ransomware kill chain specific to an organization's assets, you know, including your brands, your IPs, your domains, your tech stack, your supply chain, your vulnerabilities, very specific to your organization. And we have three main elements and sources that can that can contribute to this, including Insikt group research, customer specific information via something we call collective insights. And this is a great new feature that we have correlating customer telemetry with Recorded Future Intelligence, and also events and references from Recorded Future collection and sourcing. And what we do at a very high level is to monitor for evidence to support company assets being targeted in such a way that might lead to a ransomware event. And it's a what I love about this is it's, you know, it's a proactive approach where we are monitoring across the four stages of typical ransomware attack. So from the reconnaissance stage to initial access to internal stage to external stage. And in the reconnaissance stage, this is kind of the initial phase of an attack where our threat actors are gathering information about their targets, right, to plan their attack. This section incorporates information from group group reporting. So, you know, getting a lot of nice contextualized information from the dark web and some of the forums where we're seeing, you know, initial access sold. And then, of course, attack attack surface intelligence, running attack surface intelligence scans to to to show you those threats, very important attack surface intelligence as well as, you know, vulnerability, intelligence led vulnerability management. And then in terms of internal stage, or initial access stage rather, we're focusing on stolen identities, including the ones with technologies that are known to be abused by ransomware groups. Also the credentials, access sold on the dark web, and breach systems by by Fint seven. So, so this section of the ransomware risk profile incorporates information from Insikt Group reporting and compromised credential data to show you the threats related to leaked credentials, as well as access to your organization and third parties being sold on the dark web. And then in terms of internal stage, attackers are typically looking to establish command and control channels and move laterally within the network to expand their access and locate valuable data or systems. And, essentially, they're preparing the environment for ransomware deployment. Right? An internal stage. This stage also covers installation and privilege escalation via early stage malware. And, in terms of sources, we're combining malicious traffic analysis as part of our network intelligence, collective insight, which I just spoke about a few moments ago, sandbox analysis, insect group reporting, all to highlight evidence of communication with early stage malware, including offensive security tools. And then the final stage of the ransomware attack, the external stage where attackers deploy ransomware to encrypt files and demand a ransom, they'll often threaten to release sensitive data or permanently delete files, right, if ransom is if the ransom isn't paid. And Insikt group reporting, supports this stage to highlight instances of your organization or your third parties and suppliers being mentioned on ransomware extortion sites. Typically, at this at this stage, it's it's too late, but it's good to have visibility, on this. And so, the coverage across the ransomware kill chain specific to the organization, is really good, and I think this is a really great solution to a really a very challenging problem. Again, I don't think it's going away anytime soon. Great. Thank you. I'm gonna ask one more question on this topic and then switch over to critical infrastructure operational technology. That's something that's kind of I'm seeing a lot of questions from that in the chat. But someone has asked here, what are some trends, being seen in targeting private sector executives for business email compromise? Yeah. It's for Meghan or Jason. I actually have a anecdote, which is, yes. I think business email compromise continues to be a problem, but I think, you know, what I have observed from doing this myself for our organization is just the the rapid and sophisticated use of open source intelligence gathering for targeting of executives, knowing full well that, you know, we all have a personal life. And, yeah, is, you know, in our own organization and for some of our clients is identifying, you know, sensitive information about families and, executives and using that for extortion and for other other purposes and and BEC. So, one thing I would recommend people who are nervous about executive attacks, you know, based on the the attack on the health care CEO in in The US last year, is conducting OSINT analysis on executives to just see what's out there and see what can be removed, because, you know, those types of things, they're not just used for BEC. They're used for, blackmail. They're used for a lot of other for for targeting as well. So that's definitely something that, you know, Recorded Future or something else that good understanding of async footprint is gonna be really valuable for. Yeah. Exactly. And then from from the perspective, we've definitely we see this as an exempt as another iteration of big game hunting where threat actors are attempting to put the most effort into the target that will give them the most payout. As a result, we've seen, statistics that show that at least, I think, between 7080% of executives that reported being targeted either by a phishing campaign. And, again, going back to kind of the ways that AI can help this as well, you can actually have more, sophisticated spear phishing conversations, with these executives to try to gain gain access, gain compromising information. Great. Thank you. Thank you both. So I'm gonna ask a couple questions on OT because I know we're kind of this has been a great session, and I wanna make sure we get to as many questions as we can. If we don't answer your question, I'm very sorry. We'll try to follow-up in a blog or just share it in another way because I'm seeing so many good questions in here. So in terms of kinda like critical infrastructure and OT, one of the questions here is what's the present state of OT breaches for 2025? And judging by your previous and present experience, will OT be the main focus for ransomware disruptions or cyber warfare targets? Or will they be close to the top three preferred targets? And, yeah, Meghan, that might be for you. Sure. Well, at least I I can kick it off. So, OT is is it definitely we've seen it as a as a criminal target. Although it is it is a little harder to get to because there are, certain productions coming up, and it's also running on different operating systems than, kind of your typical, obviously, Windows, information technology enterprise. So it is a little harder to do. One of the reasons why it is so valuable, though, is if there is poor network segmentation between an organization's information technology and operational technology, the enterprise itself may not know where exactly those touch points are, kind of giving the threat actor more capability to exploit that ambiguity. Of course, on and that's on the criminal side. It's a little bit more opportunistic. If we do go into the cyber warfare side, obviously, that is a target that state sponsored actors are actively pursuing, whether it is to cause actual disruption in terms of, amplifying kind of the terror around a a bombing campaign like what we saw, a pattern of operations that we've seen Russia carry out in Ukraine, carrying out a blackout, and then following it up with, a missile attack. But we've also seen targeting, targeting and pre positioning in areas where that aren't in conflict as well. Obviously, to be able to carry out these attacks, you need to have that access into these operational technology systems in the first place. And so that is one reason why pre positioning, is an activity that is seen even sometimes years in advance prior to a military operation. I'll pass it to someone else to Did anyone else have anything to add there? Otherwise, I can ask one of the other questions. All I was gonna say is, I just wanted to, you know, echo, you know, what Meghan said, but we did a fantastic report on, Indian, energy companies prepositioned by China, RedEcho, Red Foxtrot. And, you know, those are really good thoughts about, excuse me, my dog's barking. He also likes the report. That was a good question. We're also tracking down some of these reports that have been mentioned throughout the session, and I'll start adding, links in the chat, for those who have been asking. So, we'll work on getting that one as well. So the one of the other questions here about O T is, do we think one of the main problems across the world when we talk about o t cybersecurity is the lack of human resources, expertise or awareness of how important the operational environment is taking into consideration that the majority have been on legacy type devices that were built and integrated without having security in the back of their minds. I don't know if there's one person that wants to kinda take that one. That's a really difficult one to answer. You know, every business has got their own calculus of risk and, you know, decisions to upgrade or not upgrade these types of IT technologies. And for most organizations, it's a simple acceptance of risk because the cost of replacing is so significant and these systems are so deeply embedded that there isn't an opportunity to really do much other than accept the risk of them. And, I think that's a reality for a lot of folks. I mean, they've got twenty five year old tech that they just can't literally touch. And it's just acceptance of that and what you can do around it. As Meghan says, no. We have net network segmentation, but, you know, what else can you do? There there's very limited options you can without introducing massive friction for employees and making it really hard to actually conduct business and get stuff done. Makes sense. Let's see here. I think we have time for, like, one more question. I think this is a really good question that kinda wraps up a lot of what we've talked about here, but someone's asked, what are the top five things that you should do first if you've been attacked? So example would be, like, like, containment, password change to protect yourself, ransomware or not is kind of the question. So, maybe that would be I don't know. Serge, is there something, like you a TalkShack you have with clients or Jason, something that you typically cover in those types of questions? Top five things that I would do. Well, yeah. I mean, I I think it's important, first of all. I I just wanna go back just one second, if you don't mind, just on on the, the prepositioning of of Chinese, state sponsored threat actors, because I I think it's important also in terms of, you know, recommendations to CNI customers and, who operate in that space. And there are kind of two areas that I would sort of recommend, my my customers and CNI and any any customers in the space is to use, some sort of attack surface intelligence. So I think the key here is continuous monitoring of your attack surface, so, we can prevent an attack. Detection of detection of high risk CVEs, misconfigurations, end of life software, and risky reports. This should be something that you're monitoring on a continuous basis. And then, I always go back to intelligence led vulnerability management. I think it's it's very important, especially from a ransomware perspective, making sure that you're following the vulnerability weaponization life cycle, from disclosure through to proof of concept, to exploit being likely, to a confirmed act of exploitation. I think, I think both of those are are really important, when it comes to not only ransomware, but also what we're seeing with the Chinese nation state sponsored threat actors, like we're seeing with, the typhoons, for example. I wanted to jump back to the incident response question really quickly. One, I'm not sure what, you know, the top five in order to do, but one very important, thing that you would wanna do is verify any threat actor claim that they're making and not just to make sure it's not an exaggeration, which is certainly a tactic of is particularly extortion operators. They wanna make you think that they have a greater presence or a great more sensitive data than they actually do. But they also may have more access than they are letting on as well. And so having an independent forensic investigation that allows you to verify the claims that they're making, see what they actually have access to and what they don't, and then using that in coordination with your legal team and any external communications team if this group is making public claims, can help ensure that you have kind of a coordinated, brand or reputational response as well as, what you actually need to do internally to get the adversary out of your system. Right? I just wanna I just wanna I just wanna mention one other thing actually on that. We have, a really great set of of hunting packages as well. So, I think, a a really good action here is also to run, threat hunts, across your environment. Very important, not only specific to ransomware, but maybe even precursors to ransomware. And we have a lot of great intelligence and hunting packages that Insikt put together that would be really helpful in in that respect. That's awesome. Thank you all. We have a couple more minutes, but we do have a poll here. So we'd love to know, from all of you, of the topics that we discussed, which are you most concerned about. So you should see, that pop up in a little poll section on the side near the q and a, and you can go ahead and vote. I don't know if, our panelists, while people are voting, if you wanna share, if you have an answer to this question as well. I'll go first, Megan. SaaS app defense for me is, I think, high priority. You know, the the the, connection between, you know, the organizations moving to SaaS applications and the cross cross section of that with Infostealer malware. Now whether it's, Disney compromised via Slack from Infostealer or Snowflake or other organizations. Now this this threat, you know, really cross references Infostealer malware, the SaaS apps very nicely right now, and that that is a problem for us to all collectively think about. Great. Serge, how about you? So sorry. What was the what was the question? Oh, the question is, of the topics that we discussed today, which are you most concerned about? Ransomware, SaaS app defense, generative AI impact on cybercrime, regulation, fragmentation, and complexity, or brand and executive impersonation? Let's see. I I honestly think, generative AI is something of of most concern to me. I would say yeah. I mean, I I think it'll improve and and be leveraged in in all sorts of ways as you move forward. And, you know, if it if it's not great at writing malware now, but, eventually, it might. Also, deepfakes won't improve and invariably trick people into carrying out undesirable actions. There's just no question about it. I just wanted to mention something on that, though, too. My colleague, Anna Angudo, created some great content called unmasking deepfakes and intelligence for Recorded Future, which is available on Recorded Future University. And we can, you know, we can help by monitoring threat actors and forums, analyzing deepfake training data and tools, and track deepfake distribution and impact. So if anyone's interested in learning more about that, we have a great experts corner session that Anna has done. And we've also put together a deep fake intelligence kit that will help you immensely in in this area as well. So just some recommendations there. I can provide a link to that, and you can put it in the chat for those that are on Recorded Future. Awesome. And, Meghan, how about for you? And then I'll share kind of the results. We can see it here, but, we'd love to know from your perspective after having put together all the research, what are what are you most concerned about? Yeah. Absolutely. Well, I think looking at the 2023 report where we talked about zero day volumes in SaaS apps, looking at this year, we talked about identity exploitation in SaaS apps. I think that next year's threat may involve SaaS applications. So, the question is by which vector are we going to see kind of more of the same exploitations or we see something, a little different. And, I wanna point out maybe a tangential use case, but something that I've been thinking about a lot. We recently put out a report looking at, a group we were calling Purple Bravo, which is a North Korean IT worker scam. And they gained access to, organizations, particularly in The US, in IT and cybersecurity by stealing entire identities in order to get not just, authentication into these app, but actually identity verification. So kind of posing as somebody who could gain access into this enterprise. So I think that's, a very, interesting potential attack vector and especially with, just the kind of prevalence of stolen information that is out there that enables identity theft. We've seen it used for fraud, but we could also see it used to gain access to legitimate credentials to somewhere where you're not supposed to. Great. Thank you so much. And it looks like we have nearly a tie between ransomware and the generative AI impact on cybercrime with only 22 votes for SaaS app defense. So, very curious to see how that, turns out and I'm excited for next year's, version of this, webinar. I will say to our audience, thank you so much for all the amazing questions. We there's so many that we weren't able to get to, so we're gonna kinda go back and see what we can pull together, to answer some of these other awesome questions that you guys have. And you can always reach out, out to me or, you know, anyone from Recorded Future and what we're we're happy to happy to help. So, and thank you to the panelists. Thank you for making the time today. Thank you, Meghan. Thanks for the invite. Have a great day, everyone. Thank you all.