Video: From the Report to the Board: Translating Global Cyber Threats into Organisational Risk | Duration: 3608s | Summary: From the Report to the Board: Translating Global Cyber Threats into Organisational Risk | Chapters: Webinar Introduction (22.175s), Live Q&A Introduction (208.67s), Fragmentation Across Domains (234.58s), Resilience in Fragmentation (389.985s), Geopolitical Risk Factors (618.675s), Geopolitical Cyber Impacts (916.85s), Cybercrime Ecosystem Evolution (1194.955s), Evolving Incident Response (1716.41s), AI Security Risks (2007.125s), Future of CTI (2461.075s)
Transcript for "From the Report to the Board: Translating Global Cyber Threats into Organisational Risk": Hi, everyone. Welcome to our webinar from the report to the board. Before we get started, just wanted to do a bit of digital housekeeping. You'll be able to access the q and a function on the right hand side of your screen. And if you're experiencing any technical issues, please try closing your browser and reentering the event. If you're still encountering issues, pop a note in the chat, and we'll work with you to try and resolve it. This webinar today follows the release of our 2026 state of security report, which highlights an environment of unprecedented uncertainty, driven primarily by strain on geopolitical alliances leading to the splintering and regrouping of criminal enterprises, a shift by state sponsored actors from highly visible disruptions to subtle prepositioning, and the breakdown of established norms and the convergence of previously distinct security domains. For Asia Pacific organizations specifically, this translates to shorter warning times, greater supply chain exposure, and a growing expectation from leadership to understand not just what threats exist, but what they mean for the business. The 2026 has already been marked by some significant changes even in the week leading up to this recording. While the full report and the global threat briefing webinars are available in our resources. This session aims to provide you with an alternative focus angle for the region. I'm Vivian. I'm the growth marketing manager for Asia Pacific at Recorded Future, and I'll be moderating the webinar today. I'm pleased to also introduce now Rosie Hampton, the senior threat intelligence analyst on the risk insights team. She specializes in structured analysis and strategic foresight, advising clients on how to anticipate, manage, and communicate cyber risk. Rosie has delivered workshops and briefings across Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping business leaders apply strategic foresight to shift from a react reactive to proactive security posture. Dan Elliott, also on the line today, is our APJ field CISO. He connects intelligence with strategy, helping leaders make better cybersecurity decisions with clarity and confidence. Previously, he spent fifteen years as a Canadian intelligence officer running operations against capable spec state sponsored and criminal threats. This gave him firsthand insight into adversary thinking, which he now uses to help government and industry organizations stay ahead. It's pretty straightforward for us or any intelligence vendor to provide a list of changes or trends, but our mission at Recorded Future is to help you articulate how those markets have shifted in the last thirty to sixty days and this significance, ensuring that threat intelligence remains relevant or strategic risk mitigation, not just for the CTI team to operationalize. We want you to walk away feeling equipped with the report's insights, but also able to effectively translate and communicate these complexities to your executives who are heavily concerned with commercial outcomes and broader risk business risk mitigation. We're recording this webinar on March 11 at 11AM Australian Eastern Daylight Time. Given recent events, it's important to call this out and ensure the information's accuracy and relevance. On the upside, this means that on March 12 at 2PM Australian daylight time, when the session is published for the webinar event, Dan and Rosie will actually be live on the q and a chat function, ready to answer any questions you may have. We highly encourage you to take this opportunity to chat to them directly and keep notes during the session. With that, let's dive in. So Rosie and Dan, according to the report, 2025 is the year of fragmentation. Rosie, what does this mean, and why is it important? Thanks, Viv. Well, yeah, we called 2025 the year of fragmentation primarily because it showed up across every, layer of the threat landscape, be that cybercrime, technology, and also geopolitics. So from a cybercriminal perspective, we saw, law enforcement pressure scattering the ecosystem. So instead of a few dominant groups, we're now seeing a decentralized service based networks of ransomware operators, access brokers that are harder to track and consequently more resilient. From a technology from a technological standpoint, The US China AI race accelerated and split into parallel ecosystems, so we're seeing different chips and standards, different data rules and export controls. And so digital alignment is no longer global. It's actually increasingly block based, and organizations are having to navigate those competing technological and also regulatory spheres. But I think particularly given recent events, the most consequential fragmentation we saw was in the geopolitical domain. You know, 2025 was really the year that we start to see the unraveling of postwar security architecture where major powers largely worked together through shared institutions and coordinated rules. This started to weaken. We saw countries acting alone or in smaller blocks, more countries and major powers prioritizing national interests over that collective compromise. So taking The US, for example, you know, the expansion of export controls, and tariffs on strategic sectors like tech and critical minerals, as well as taking more direct action in regions such as Iran. So the result is this kind of weakening of alliance cohesion and, as a result, more unpredictability. And that environment in and of itself created space for opportunism. We saw regional powers being more willing to test boundaries. In the report, in particular, we focused in onboard attentions between India and Pakistan, as well as Thailand and Cambodia, and we are still seeing this in the widening instability across the, Middle East that we're seeing right now. So I suppose in some, twenty twenty five year of fragmentation, fragmentation wasn't just a passing trend. It's now the operating environment that organizations are finding themselves in. Fantastic. Thank you, Rosie. And I guess with that, Dan, this new fragmentation or this new way of operating, how does this change the way you and your peers communicate cyber risk in board level conversations? Thanks, Vivian. And thanks, Rosie. That frames it out really well. I think what we're looking at when we talk about a change in operating model is also a change in reporting model. So whether it's formalized reporting to the board or on an ad hoc basis when we're having executive conversations, this fragmentation has created more actors, overlapping crises and less warning time. So we've got to a point where we began talking about incident response kind of practicing and that idea of sweating in training so you don't bleed in battle and then we shifted to instant management, how are we reporting this up, how are we communicating this out, how are we addressing regulators, to the new shift which I've really seen at the end of last year and into this year which is that systemic resilience. That notion that fragmentation has really encouraged prepositioning of threat actors in our environments rather than an immediate attack, immediate disruption. And and what that really means is that operational resilience is the name of the game because cybersecurity used to be about stopping attacks. And and CISOs were put in a place to own that risk and be responsible for stopping an attack when a leader came to them and said, are we secure? Could a threat actor get in? And and the new shift is we have to operate under pressure. How does that look? And and what exactly can we do to put ourselves in a better place for this consistent pressure of assumed breach? Fantastic. Thank you. And so I guess in this this new world, these new operating models, these the new time boundedness to it. What does resilience mean? We we hear this word a lot, you know, within our industry. But what does it mean to you both in 2026? Yeah. I think resilience is definitely the new buzzword, but, it's really important. You know, if we think that fragmentation is defining the operating environment, resilience is defining how organizations survive within that operating environment. So in other words, the ability to absorb disruption, whether that's a cyber attack, supply chain issues, regulatory changes, geopolitical instability, wars, how organizations can navigate that and then return to stable operations quickly. Because, you know, the risks we're seeing today, as Dan said, they are interconnected and they're cascading. To take the example of what's going on right now in The Middle East, you know, the closure of the Strait Of Hormuz then creates immediate second order impacts for APJ organizations in the form of higher energy prices, shipping disrupt disruptions, inflation risk, and more importantly, particularly for us within the security space, you know, the application amplification of cyber risk. So economic stresses tend to drive fraud, opportunistic intrusions, influence operations, etcetera. And so I think the closure of the state of Hormuz is actually, highlights the dangers of single points of failure, and resilience in that context means reducing dependencies on any one supplier, system, or region. In a security sense, it's maintaining tested backups. It's strengthening your identity access controls. Or in look kinda zooming out more broadly, it's making sure that stress in one part of the system doesn't bring down the whole organization. Really good points. Dan, do you have any thoughts there to add? Yeah. I I used to speak about this as as simply that right of boom. So what do we do after we're attacked? How do we get back up faster? Because, you know, a year or two, even three years ago, what we were looking at was the most costly attacks were the ones that people didn't know how to react. And I think that that was that resilience when the buzzword first began was, you know, we can't look at just response. We have to look at instant resilience. How do we get back up and operate? And I think there's a couple of things that Rosie drew out that are really important. One is that avoiding single points of failure. And the second I think is interconnected risks. When we talk about resilience, we're not just talking about uptime. How can we maintain connectivity? How can we maintain our systems? But instead we're looking at resilience across multiple spheres of risk. Whether that's financial risk when we're talking about trade values, whether we're talking about supply chains, whether we're talking about tariffs, and maybe we're talking about operational risks within organizations who are actually shipping us goods or consumers who are getting there or how things are being paid for or conflicts that are are preventing goods from getting to us. I think cyber is kind of that ubiquitous chain across all parts of our business. Resilience is about having an awareness of where the failure points are all across that, across all of our risk verticals, and then being able to discuss that out and plan that out further in advance rather than just assuming we have to watch for that one supplier that's providing us a single point of failure. Instead, it's maintaining critical operations no matter what. It's looking at how we can recover quickly and it's how can we maintain operations under multiple crises that are happening all at once. Really great points there. And I suppose now as we kind of dive into all of those multiple spheres of risk, it's it's really interesting to then maybe touch on some of the geopolitical risks and how that translates into that, fold of business risk. So a question for you both, what are the geopolitical fault lines or risk factors that Asia Pacific organizations should be closely monitoring right now? I might pass this one over to Rosie to kick us off. Sure. Thanks, Viv. We've touched already on the sort of second order implications from what's going on in The Middle East. That is, of course, incredibly topical right now and something which is having a direct impact on organizations in this region. But another, I would say, probably the most important structural risk in APJ region is actually US China strategic competition, particularly around tech, economic security, and Taiwan. You know, it's not just about tariffs. It's export controls on advanced chips. It's investment screening. It's supply chain realignment, is growing pressure on companies over here to align with a particular side. Now, obviously, Taiwan sits at the center of that because of semiconductors and, you know, any disruption there would have cataclysmic global impact, but there is a sort of important nuance is one thing that's often over prioritized is the idea of an imminent full scale invasion of Taiwan. Now, I'm not suggesting that's not a real risk, it certainly is, but in the near term, next six months to a year, I think the path is more of sustained gray zone competition between The US and China, all of which sit below that threshold of conflict, you know, things like cyber activity, economic coercion, influence operations, sort of regulatory competition as well, because all of these factors create constant strain for organizations in APJ. Know, export controls hit chip firms in Korea. You have an incident in South China Sea that's potentially gonna raise shipping costs for organizations over here, and then, you know, we're all abiding by sanctions regimes that can impact, you know, banks in all countries within this region. So, I guess the deeper trend to monitor here is not, is there going to be a war, but it's actually that constant competition between The US and China is creating a difficult and complex operating environment for organizations in this region. Thank you, Rosie. I guess, Dan, to your point, I'd love to hear from you and also the what are some of the practical steps in that prioritisation that Rosie was mentioning about? You know, some things organisations should definitely prioritize, but what else should they be closely looking at and, you know, how do they mitigate this risk of, geopolitical fallout? Thanks. So I'll say as a Canadian who's now living in Australia, I've sat in two of what are considered those middle powers and often relied on both the economy and the military force and frankly the cyber force of larger powers around us. And what the latest round of conflicts and fragmentation has really shown is that cyber conflict rarely stays within the geographic boundaries from whence it began. So a conflict in any area of the world is going to impact business here. And this is no more clear than for APJ. As I looked from my time in Canada, it was easier to look at certain conflict zones and write them off or at least minimize their impact here. Now we sit in a region that is closely touched both geographically and alliance wise with almost every global conflict that's going on. Practically for an organization, they often look at just the big four and and how do these big four state actors, whether it's Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran, how do they impact me, or can I do anything about it? And I think what the the shift has to be to the can they do anything to us and can we do anything about it has to be is what are the strategic realities of each of those nation actors and their secondary actors. So if you look at hacktivists and criminal organizations that they're leveraging and which group or or which region is likely operating in our industry. So you kinda have to start at that 30,000 foot view and work your way down, whether it's, you know, China that's really looking at specialization and persistence, whether it's Russia that's looking at disruption, whether we're talking about North Korea that's looking at financial gain. I mean, all of these nation state actors are looking at a specific area within a sector, and we as leaders in our industry have to start to assess what's most likely to impact us. Now conversely, think it's really important for every organizational cyber leader to bring forward to all the other leaders in the organization the question that, what does it matter today? So when I'm talking of it from a CTI landscape or from a SOC management area, I need to know those things. But is it important to my board, to legal, to regulatory, to the CRO's office, to all these other groups within the organization as to who the threat actor is and where it's coming from? Because at the time of an attack, a lot of them are looking for the same thing, persistence. And they're looking for information and they're looking to to leverage that data. So it's more important than who's attacking me or who's in my environment is to have those specialist groups investigating that and have me reporting up, you know, what this means for our data, what this means for our information. So practically speaking, I think there's a reporting element and then there's an operational element that CISO, that cyber leader is really the point at which those two pieces come together and they have to understand where it diverges, where what I'm saying in order to get things done separates a bit from what we're doing and how we're running operations and investigating. Yeah, it's really great that you say that and it kind of ties back to that whole resilience question that I asked before and it really seems like resilience is really rooted in the ability to combat or work through these noises essentially and help the business identify what is truly a priority. And that's where the opportunity sits for CTR teams who are on the front line. Right? They can they can see everything that's going on and actually help the business make a a measured decision as to where the focus needs to be, where the investments need to be. And, yeah, that's that's really a great way to kind of, like, level up, you know, that operational speak into something a lot more strategic. I guess just continuing on the point about, state sponsored actors, Rosie, can you speak to some of those key trends, in state sponsored cyber activity that we saw in the report? Yeah, sure. So I think Dan, thank you, has touched on some of these already, but to sort of reiterate and add a little bit of color, you know, in here at Recorded Future Insit Group, we primarily track China, Russia, Iran, and North Korean nation state activity. And across the board, we did notice a continuation of that shift, which we'd possibly picked up the year before towards quieter, longer term access inside networks. You know, China was the probably most clear and obvious example of that operating model, we reported on RedMike, as well as other, APT actors focusing persistent access to telecoms and service providers to gain sort of global visibility and enhance their own strategic positioning. For Russia, it was a combination of credential theft and cloud access along with pressure on critical infrastructure, particularly in Western aligned states, sort of fortify their war effort. North Korea, it was a blend of their traditional revenue generation with espionage where we saw this most clearly was the IT worker scam, purple echo, purple bravo, infiltrating contract networks and remote hiring processes in order to gain sort of legitimate complex commercial access and as well as fund the regime. Iran behaves slightly differently. It does do the prepositioning access, but it seems to be more willing to move quickly and use that access for more immediate disruption, particularly during periods of regional tension. But I think what we noticed is there was just an overlap in how these groups are operating, whether that be identity abuse, the targeting of edge devices, and using commercial spyware or AI enabled influence operations, whatever it is, you know, the goal appeared to be the same. It's it's gaining that quiet access sitting inside networks and being ready to use that as and when tensions spike. So I guess for organizations, that that's the core risk. It's no longer those big visible huge cyber attacks. It's that who's in my network and where and when can they move and when can they operationalize that access. Definitely, definitely. And yeah, I guess with this operating model, I'm curious to understand from you Dan, if this risk remains persistent, how should organisations in the Asia Pacific respond and what do they need to do to kind of determine what the next step is? And I think it would be really great if you could provide some sector specific examples as well as to how that security strategy needs to evolve. Sure. First of all, think that there's an idea of reporting that has to shift a bit and this is probably going to be the most difficult part for cybersecurity leaders to be able to shift is to an assumed breach mentality. So, and this is, I think this is industry agnostic. We have to move to a point where boards, leadership, whoever is reporting above you in dealing with both strategic risks and operational risks, understands that shift in mentality. So we are no longer talking about when or if we'll be attacked. Let's assume that we're under breach consistently and constantly, and in this manner, we can adjust the way that we're reacting. Now, the way I tend to speak to CISOs about treating this is addressing two pieces most clearly, and one is identity management and the other is data management. And when I talk about data management, there's a whole bunch of aspects under that, but really it's knowing where your data is stored, categorizing it, addressing its location, getting it off endpoints, and and starting to get to a point where, where can a threat actor reach our our crown jewels? What is our crown jewels? How much will it cost us to have downed areas in specific points of our network? And what are critical systems? And what's the criticality of different data? And I think that shifts for every industry. There are industries where IP is the core, the other is where customer data is the most important, and I think you have to know that. If you don't know where your data is, then there's no way for you to manage it, and there's no way for you to be able to put guardrails around it and address the identity risks around that. Now when we talk about industry specifics and how different industries can react, I think that that goes back to what industry is most at risk from those prime actors, from those kind of big four state actors. When I'm talking about organizations that are involved in global logistics, well, the points that are happening in The Middle East, those large scale conflicts, are more likely to impact you first. When we're talking about technology manufacturers, well, you really need to consider the conflict, the quiet conflict that's happening in Taiwan and how that's going to impact your resourcing. Same with mining, and we see a large mining industry here in Australia that really has to consider both ownership, access, permanence, as well as logistics, and that's really impacted by those quiet, constant attackers that are in your environment. I think that where you begin has to be which attacker is most concerned with you and your supply chain, who's in your supply chain, especially if you have any government contracts, and then looking at how you can manage the data and identify the data that you're controlling. I mean, because that's really what most of these threat actors are looking at. Definitely. I really like to your point around shifting the mentality to the assumed breach. It's not a matter of if but when almost. And yeah, it's kind of another another opportunity for CTI teams to really understand it and make the connection between what's happening on the ground and the operational side to the company's crown jewels. Right? What are we actually trying to protect here? What is the risk? And, you know, working in that collaborative manner to to mitigate that risk as well. Moving into cybercrime in transition, I'm interested to understand your view on the commercialization of ransomware. Is it more of a threat now to the security ecosystem, or is it just more noise and competition between those threat actors? What do you think, Rosie? Well, I think it's probably prudent to just define what we mean when we talk about the commercialization of ransomware. And, essentially, what we mean is now we're seeing ransomware operating like a service economy, like a SaaS model with updates, with support, with revenue sharing. And that, in my view, has created an environment which is more dangerous for organizations. You know, last year, we saw law enforcement pressure disrupt some major players, but it also fragmented the market. On Insect, for example, we tracked, I think it was 289 new variants of ransomware, so that was an increase by 33% compared to the year prior. What was interesting, though, is the payments, were relatively flat, and so what you see is more actors competing for the same returns. And it's that competition that makes it more dangerous because we're seeing more ransomware groups, affiliates moving faster. They're also relying heavily on things like stolen credentials and exposed accesses, and in a lot of time, it's a kind of smash and smash and grab. So they prioritize data theft and extortion, sometimes even before the full encryption has been deployed. So, yeah, the ecosystem is more crowded, it's more agile, more volume driven, and so for defenders, while, you know, criminal criminal profiting from that might be less predictable, predictable, it does mean that organizations are under that sustained pressure. There's more intrusion attempts. There's faster attacks. There's constant threat to credentials. So I think that noise in and of itself creates a threat. So the risk really hasn't gone down. It's just it's more of, like you mentioned, that noise and and the volume of threats, that might come through, and and be at risk for organizations. So Dan, with that in mind, what does incidence response evolution to combat faster attribution cycles and hybrid criminal state activity? What does that look like to you? So this is this is really interesting, Vivian. I think that what we're seeing with cybercrime being an industrialized industry now, an industrialized process, is that attribution at a functional level is less important. I've raised this before, and having worked previously in the insurance industry, I'll bring this viewpoint forward as well. Most of the insurance carriers I've worked for and with cared less about who attacked you and cared more about what you were doing to prevent any attack. And I think that with all the fragmentation in cybercrime groups despite arrests and and with so many affiliates using products that are designed by a a RAS provider and and with access brokers providing it across, there's a couple different things that companies need to worry about. The first thing is that you have to be concerned about your data over the long term, that that long tail theft. And what I mean by that is if you have a breach today or if you had a breach a year ago, you can never really consider it done. Any of the data that's stolen, whether we're talking about IP, customer data, or encrypted data, we can never consider that closed because we're seeing it recycled. We're seeing it sold. We're seeing it put on the market two and three times over. But but you don't close that transaction, if we wanna call it that. You don't close that incident out ever. And that's really difficult because we're used to in, out, fix, and then it's done. I think the second piece, which is important to be reporting up and discussing at that leadership level, is that when things are stolen and posted on dark web or on telegram or elsewhere, it doesn't mean that it's recent. And this is difficult when we start to look at the regulatory landscape. Very little time to be able to report to regulators if we believe we've had a breach or if we believe that there has been theft of data. And when when I look at what's posted on Telegram, when I look at what's popping up on the dark web, there are multiple instances of this being old breach data that was posted on a dark website or on dark web market that was pulled down, and is now being put up again by a different threat actor, a different individual, and we don't know if it's a new breach or not. And I think those discussions are important to have with your leadership so that they understand we have a a regulatory requirement to report this because we we don't know. And and operating under an assumed breach environment, we have to assume the worst initially. But that doesn't necessarily mean that every time this is a new incident and a new breach. So we have to really have our management executive and risk people understand those differences so that when we are reporting out, when we are dealing with regulators, there are nuances to that and we have time to work through it while we're maintaining all of our regulatory requirements pretty darn quickly. Yeah, really great point there with just regards to attribution is not as important these days as that prevention. Right? And to your point, Rosie, earlier about how noisy the market is now and with that the evolution of that service economy really, we are we are combating that noise. And your points around, Dan, with that long tail effect, you know, looking beyond the breach as well, just it's not a set and forget after you fix it. It's what do you need to do to then ensure that any risks that come up after that can be mitigated and, you know, how do you input that predictive model almost? And then, you know, the the importance of timely intelligence is part of all of this because what you often see is is not a recent thing, you know. And so being able to really understand the context around that, whether, you know, this breach has happened before, it might not be the first incident, you know, being able to really discern with the information that you're receiving on whatever forums you see it on, the the need for that accuracy and that additional context is so important. So the question on everybody's mind right now is well, the top topic everywhere is AI. Right? And we touched on in this the state of security report quite in-depth. So I'm curious to understand from the both of you, what is the true risk of AI in cyber? And do you think it's overstated, or are we really underestimating the second order effects? Rosie, I'll pass this one over to you if you'd like to kick us off. Yeah. I mean, it's it's one of those, isn't it? And there's a lot of talk about the overhyping of AI threats. And at a tactical level, yes, that's true. We're not seeing, you know, autonomous AI running cyber campaigns on its own yet. And, actually, the vast majority of data breaches are still coming down to things like stolen credentials and phishing and unpatched systems, you know, the typical, threat threats that we'd seen even prior to the existence of AI. But I think where we are seeing AI changing the landscape is the scale. You know, it's making social engineering faster and cheaper. It's making it more convincing. So we're seeing a higher volume of an AI aided social engineering attacks. And I guess kinda linked to that, the real shift that we are reporting on the moment is the link to identity. We've spoken a little bit about this already today. But AI powered impersonation, so we're seeing a rise in voice cloning attacks, synthetic ID fraud, you know, very beautifully, AI polished business email compromise campaigns, and all of these things are eroding those trust signals. And, you know, modern organizations, run on identity and access management through single sign on, MFA, your vendor accesses, and contractors that you're getting in. You know, if attackers can convincingly impersonate trusted individuals, then they're not attacking an endpoint anymore. They're actually attacking the trust model beneath that. And so, of AI, we're needing to treat identity as a continuous security function as opposed to a sort of one time check. So, yeah, it was just eroding our trust in digital yeah, I suppose, yeah, an erosion of digital trust is where I see the biggest threat with AI. Definitely. And I guess I'm curious to understand, you know, from a communication standpoint, Dan, internally, like we're seeing all these risks on the front line. We're seeing the ways that AI is used, in social engineering. How how does this change the way that the business needs to, you know, carry out those checks around identity and verifications and how does it change that enterprise security model? Sure. I think that one of the key pieces to look at, and it was on the last slide there, and I think this is, if you're going to write one thing down, this is it. AI is a force multiplier. It's not going to replace your staff. It's not going to replace attackers. It's going to allow both sides to do better what they're already doing. And and that's important. I speak still speak to leadership, still speak to boards today that don't quite understand it from that lens. They're looking for it to be, you know, the the panacea, the the one stop solution for all things, and and it's really not. And I come from a a governance and risk background, so I'll I'll bring it forward in that lens. When we look at things from good governance and risk management, if you have poor governance in place in your organization, whether it's cyber or risk more broadly, AI is not going to fix that for you. And we're still is that I see a lot of people that are using AI to move faster internally as part of that technology adoption. How can we obtain customers faster? How can we communicate with customers faster? How can we improve all of our internal policies? How can we write code faster? And I think that we're missing that AI also has to assist us with the brakes. And AI governance and AI ethics has to be part of that early communication so that internally, the AI risk that we're not missing is what's going to happen a few years down the road or few months the way it's moving when our AI systems and AI agents are so closely tied in with all of our data and so closely tied in with all of our operational processes. So I think that's one thing I want to draw out first because it's so important. The second piece, when I look at it from a risk perspective is that we have AI agents who are currently operating within systems that are leveraging identities that are managed by individuals. And we really have to get to that next step where AI agents have their own identities within our systems, within our networks, so that we can separate those two. And that will allow us to more specialize the management of those agents and control what they have access to, what they don't, what the role includes and what it doesn't. And right now we're at a point where a lot of that can be leveraged by an outside attacker and we don't really know what's there. I still speak to organizations that don't really have guardrails around where AI is used among their employee workforce and having communicated to the employees why those guardrails exist, we're still dealing with different organizations where LLMs are being used by employees without controls or guardrails or where we have things like OpenClaw being leveraged with corporate data. So it really becomes a risk that an attacker can use your AI systems, use your LLM access the same way that you can to move faster. So know what's there, manage it properly and get guardrails around it early before an outside attacker will leverage it to his or her advantage. So it really seems that, you know, AI, you know, the risk factors are both the external, which is, for example, the social engineering piece that Rosie you touched on before, and and the internal as well, which is our own employees. How we're using it and what are the risk factors there. I like, Dan, what you said about AI being a force multiplier. Completely agree. I think that often it's not AI itself that's the enemy, but it's the enabler for whatever decision you choose. And so, you know, there's an opportunity for organizations to really also leverage AI to help them, you know, scale and combat those threats. But, yeah, predominantly, it is that scale piece and and helping to cover some of those gaps. And I think CTI teams really have the opportunity here to enforce those guardrails and then we see time and time again when regulations are moving as fast as the technology that they are aiming to kind of provide those parameters around. So what can CTI teams do to help communicate those risks when we're seeing them right at the front line, and and ensure that the business is protected long before it even becomes, you know, a regulatory mandate. So we've touched a lot of themes today, and, we're kind of coming to the end of the time here. But I'd like to kind of close out and hear from the both of you, you know, what's what's one or two significant use cases for CTI that you will predict that will change in 2026 and ultimately what does that look like? Yeah, so for me I think we're seeing it a little bit already but I imagine it will become unmistakable in its importance in 2026 is, CTI moving from a warning function to a resilience function. So we're obviously currently navigating an era of overlapping crises and shocks from sanctions to geopolitical tensions, wars, cyber incidents, conflicts, regulatory fragmentation, you name it. Organizations are having to deal with all of these crises concurrently, You know? And and they're not rare crises anymore. They are not black swan events. They're recurring and consistent stress tests. And so I guess the impetus is gonna be on intelligence teams to focus less on static long term forecasting and long term prediction and instead more on continuous scenario planning. And so the link to that, because I do a lot of scenario planning in my current work, and the questions aren't necessarily, you know, what's what's definitely gonna happen in 10 time. It's actually, you know, how fast can an organization make decisions under pressure? If this happened, how would we coordinate our teams if multiple shocks hit all at once? And so it's about testing organizations' agility, ability to respond, the contingency plans and the contingency contingency plans. I think CTI will sit at the center of that function. And then I suppose linked to that as well, you know, CTI is starting to reshape structure, not just reporting risk. So we have tightly connected systems and, optimization optimization for costs and efficiencies and creates fragility. Know, intelligence, I think, is increasingly, particularly CTR, going to be used to inform organizations, of where to invest and, you know, diversification of suppliers and compliance and things like that. So it's a kind of movement moving CCI out of the SOC and into the boardroom, making it more of a business consideration, and allowing it to inform, you know, business decisions. Absolutely, absolutely. Dan, did you want to add anything to that? Yeah, I think that that's a great spot there where we're looking at moving CTI into the boardroom. I still speak to CTI teams who report up and lateral reporting might go as wide as a GRC team or to the red team, but realistically they're collecting information and they're reporting it up. The two problems with that that I see is that if you have a really good CTI team, which most of the ones I've spoken to are really good quality teams, they're not just collecting cyber threat information, they're collecting intelligence, and then they're really building it and assessing it in a way as to how it's going to impact that organization. If they're only reporting it up, they're missing all the other operational divisions that could benefit from that knowledge. So I think that 2026 needs to be about pulling down silos in a really meaningful way so that cyber threat intelligence leaders are speaking to risk leaders, speaking to financial leaders, are speaking to operational leaders and logistics teams, so that as all of those groups are doing their planning and their risk management, they're taking advantage of the cyber risk information and of the logistical and geopolitical information that is being collected. And now we've got to a point where good AI systems with good governance have the methodology to collate that and assess it and build it into really meaningful reports and meaningful reporting structures so that each division in your organization can benefit from that. So if I had to make one request to cyber threat leaders this year, it would be to have formal or at least informal conversations across your organization so that everybody is benefiting from the additional risk information that you have. And the reason I speak to that is as a risk professional, I see risk as a trajectory, not a single point in time or a single decision point. And as we traverse over that time, our options start to dwindle. We get to a point where leadership and boards are are making a decision with their last option that's available. If cyber threat intelligence jumps in earlier, they can often help lead those teams to better decision making earlier on when they have more options. I think that's a really great opportunity for businesses to succeed this year. Fantastic. Thank you so much. I really love both your points there. I mean, firstly, Rosie talking about the ability to to move towards this adaptive scenario planning rather than just this static kind of, you know, procedure and and looking at something at a point in time, but continuing to build on resilience and resilience really being about that agility return and bounce back and return to normal. And and, you know, Dan, moving the CTI team from, you know, those front lines into the boardroom and how to frame those discussions so that it can lead to that stronger decision making, not just on the operational front, but really for the whole business. So, you know, I think based on, you know, all these conversations, these great points today, you know, for you as the audience, we really hope that you found these points to be really useful and helped you to kind of start thinking about how you're going to reframe some of those conversations that you have with those non technical, I suppose, decision makers and budget holders and and kind of positioning your team and your function, you know, less as, you know, about warning signals and more about being essential towards resilience and that broader kind of business strategy. Dan, Rosie, thank you so much for your time today. Really appreciate you taking the time to walk us through your thoughts and and, you know, how the insights from the state of security report can be applied, you know, to an executive discussion. For everybody, watching, please be sure this recording will be made available to you at the conclusion of the event. We'll also be sending out a couple of additional resources, including the executive version of the state of security report, which you might find useful as you start to kind of think about how to frame those conversations. Thank you everyone for your time and we hope to see you soon. Thank you. Thank you.